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Article 3

Lemkin’s Situation
TOWARD A RHETORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF
GENOCIDE
*

Perry S. Bechky

†

“You must build the law!”–Raphael Lemkin.1
“[L]aw is in the first place a language, a set of terms and texts and
understandings that give to certain speakers a range of things to say
to each other.”–James Boyd White.2

INTRODUCTION
Raphael Lemkin coined the word genocide during World
War II. The word first appears in his 1944 treatise Axis Rule in
3
Occupied Europe. Chapter IX begins: “New conceptions require
4
new terms.”
5
Lemkin regarded genocide as not merely a new word,
but a new “conception,” a new way to understand the Nazi
horrors then unfolding. A Jewish refugee from occupied
6
Poland, Lemkin invented his word to help others see the
*

© 2012 Perry S. Bechky. All rights reserved.
Visiting Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law; JD,
Columbia Law School; AB, Stanford University. For all their help, I thank Tom
Antkowiak, Pat Brown, Mark Chinen, Sir Martin Gilbert, Steve Jacobs, Mark Janis,
Lily Kahng, Won Kidane, Jack Kirkwood, Bob Menanteaux, Tom Morawetz, and Sirina
Tsai, as well as my research assistants David Faber, James Kennedy, Brian Krupczak,
Mallory Nelson, and Nicole Trask. All mistakes are my own.
1
A.M. Rosenthal, A Man Called Lemkin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1988, at A31
(quoting Lemkin).
2
JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW, at xi (1985).
3
See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS, at xi, 79 (1944)
[hereinafter LEMKIN, AXIS RULE]. Some scholars prefer to date genocide to 1943, noting
that Lemkin uses the word in the preface to Axis Rule, which is dated November 15,
1943. Id. at xi, xv.
4
Id. at 79.
5
In this article, I italicize a word when talking about the word instead of using
the word in the ordinary way. For example: Hitler committed genocide; Lemkin invented
genocide. Here, as in the title itself, genocide is shorthand for “the word ‘genocide.’”
6
Although Lemkin describes himself as Polish, the village where he was
raised “changed hands successive times” during his lifetime: “Bezwodne . . . had been
under Russian czarist rule; it then shifted repeatedly between Germany and Belarus
(except for a period during the inter-war when it formed part of the Second Polish
Republic).” Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Human Rights and Genocide: The Work of Lauterpacht
and Lemkin in Modern International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1163, 1166 (2009).
†
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pattern of Nazi acts as he saw them—as “the crime of crimes.”
From understanding, Lemkin hoped, preventative action would
follow. Specifically, Lemkin envisioned legal action against
genocide: he wanted “all nations of the civilized world” to sign a
treaty to bring about the laws and mechanisms needed to
8
criminalize and prosecute genocide.
Lemkin pursued this ambition relentlessly. He doggedly
sought meetings with prosecutors, drafters, negotiators, and
decision-makers in Geneva, London, New York, Nuremberg,
9
Paris, and Washington. He occupied vacant offices in the United
10
Nations “like a hermit crab”; he walked the UN corridors for
years, and, in order “[t]o see an ambassador, he would plan and
11
plot for weeks and sit for days in reception rooms.” He gave
speeches, wrote articles and letters, and drafted legal texts.
And he proved remarkably successful. Nuremberg
12
prosecutors mentioned genocide in the indictment and trial.
Just two years after Axis Rule, the newfound UN General
Assembly unanimously passed Resolution 96(I), which
condemns genocide as “a crime under international law” that
13
“shocks the conscience of mankind.” Then, in just two more
years, the General Assembly approved the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the
Genocide Convention) as the UN’s first major action to protect
14
human rights. The Genocide Convention testifies to the power
of both ideas and unyielding determination. Lemkin’s efforts
would prompt a UN official to observe, decades later, that

7

See Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, UN
BULLETIN 70, 70 (Jan. 15, 1948) [hereinafter Lemkin, UN BULLETIN] (“[G]enocide must
be treated as the most heinous of all crimes. It is the crime of crimes, one that not only
shocks our conscience but affects deeply the best interests of mankind.”); Raphael
Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man (unpublished draft), in PIONEERS OF GENOCIDE
STUDIES 365, 383 (Samuel Totten & Steven Jacobs eds., 2002) [hereinafter Lemkin,
Totally Unofficial Man].
8
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiii, 93.
9
See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 27, 49-60 (2002).
10
Id. at 51.
11
Rosenthal, supra note 1.
12
See John Barrett, Raphael Lemkin and ‘Genocide’ at Nuremberg, 19451946, in THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION SIXTY YEARS AFTER ITS ADOPTION 35, 45-47
(Christoph Safferling & Eckart Conze eds., 2010).
13
The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. Doc. A/231 (Dec. 11, 1946)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 96 (I)].
14
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/760 (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed the next day. See G.A. Res. 217
(III) (A), U.N. Doc. A/777 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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“[n]ever in the history of the United Nations has one private
15
individual conducted such a lobby.”
Lemkin’s word changed the language as well as the law.
Its use is not reserved to legal discourse, for it plays a vital
political role too. Since Lemkin, mass atrocities routinely give
rise to genocide discourse. The “Is it genocide?” debates recur
16
over the Bahais, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Burundi . . . . These
debates prove that genocide matters. It may matter less in law
than is sometimes believed—but it matters in morality, in
17
politics, in policy. The Clinton administration cowered before
the word lest it compel action in Rwanda that the
18
The Bush
Administration did not want to take.
administration described Darfur as genocide, with the
President expressly acknowledging the “moral obligation” the
19
word entailed, but its failure to commit itself publicly to
further action prompted a political movement successful
enough to win (over administration objections) passage of the
20
first-ever federal statute approving state divestment. For a
meaningful segment of the public, genocide is different—and
21
worse—than other atrocities. It is the “crime of crimes.” It
15

WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF
CRIMES 29 (2d ed. 2009) (quoting JOHN HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED
NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 54 (1984)). Evidencing contemporary recognition of
Lemkin’s singular work on the Genocide Convention, the New York Times ran
Lemkin’s photograph with the caption “His Idea Adopted” in its story reporting UN
approval of the Convention. U.N. Votes Accord Banning Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1948, at 12. See generally Henry La Cossitt, The Man Who Outlawed Genocide, N.Y.
HERALD TRIB. THIS WEEK MAG., Jan. 7, 1951, at 14; Herbert Yahraes, He Gave a Name
to the World’s Most Horrible Crime, COLLIER’S, Mar. 3, 1951, at 56.
16
See, e.g., A Brief Listing of Some of the Genocidal Acts that Have Occurred
During the 20th Century, 24 SOC. SCI. REC. 94 (1987).
17
See, e.g., Memorandum from Assistant Secretaries of State on “Has
Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?,” May 21, 1994, at 2-3, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw052194.pdf (“A USG statement
that acts of genocide have occurred would not have any particular legal
consequences. . . . [but it] could increase pressure for USG activism in response to the
crisis in Rwanda.”).
18
For example, a Pentagon memo warned, “Be Careful. Legal at State was
worried about this yesterday—Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to
actually ‘do something.’” See POWER, supra note 9, at 359.
19
President George W. Bush, Remarks at the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, in 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 458, 460 (Apr. 18, 2007) (“No one
who sees these pictures can doubt that genocide is the only word for what is happening
in Darfur and that we have a moral obligation to stop it.”).
20
See generally Perry S. Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U.
PENN. J. INT’L L. 823 (2009); Perry S. Bechky, The Politics of Divestment, in THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Tomer Broude et al. eds., 2011).
21
See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 653-54 (defending “the crime of crimes”
as the subtitle of his treatise). For a discussion of Lemkin’s use of this phrase, see sources
cited supra note 7.
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separates the extraordinarily evil from the ordinarily evil. It
demands attention, concern, resources—and action.
The NGO Investors Against Genocide captures this
22
point with its tagline: “Draw the Line at Genocide.” The small
print clarifies, however, that the NGO means “genocide or crimes
23
against humanity.” In other words, it likes the word genocide but
finds the Conventional definition too cramped to “draw the line”
there. It is not alone. A recent task force on genocide prevention,
led by two former U.S. Cabinet Secretaries, made the same
24
move. Many others deploy genocide as they personally define it,
25
often as something akin to extermination of civilians, territory
now covered by crimes against humanity. In truth, the
Conventional definition is controversial, difficult, narrow,
nonintuitive, and—unsurprisingly—used mainly by lawyers. The
public may “draw the line” elsewhere, giving genocide a different
meaning in morality and politics than in international law. But
policy often sits at the intersection of politics and law, and therein
26
lies the problem with the semantic gap.
There is a vast literature criticizing the concept of
genocide, its definition, and its function and priority in public
22

See INVESTORS AGAINST GENOCIDE, http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.net
(last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
23
See
Genocide-Free
Investing,
INVESTORS
AGAINST
GENOCIDE,
http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.net/genocide-freeinvesting (last visited Feb. 1,
2012) (“The key section of our genocide-free investing shareholder proposal submissions
says: Shareholders request that the Board institute transparent procedures to prevent
holding investments in companies that, in management’s judgment, substantially
contribute to genocide or crimes against humanity, the most egregious violations of
human rights.” (emphasis added)).
24
See, e.g., MADELEINE ALBRIGHT & WILLIAM COHEN, PREVENTING
GENOCIDE: A BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS, at xxi-xxii (2008). Under the heading
“Avoiding Definitional Traps,” Albright & Cohen write:
[T]here is the definitional challenge of invoking the word genocide, which has
unmatched rhetorical power. The dilemma is how to harness the power of the
word to motivate and mobilize while not allowing debates about its definition
or application to constrain or distract policymakers from addressing the core
problems it describes. To avoid the legalistic arguments that have repeatedly
impeded timely and effective action, the task force has defined its scope in this
report as the prevention of “genocide and mass atrocities,” meaning large-scale
and deliberate attacks on civilians. . . . We use the term genocide in this
report as a shorthand expression for this wider category of crimes.
Id. But see William Schabas, “Definitional Traps” and Misleading Titles, 4 GENOCIDE
STUD. & PREVENTION 177 (2009).
25
See ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 15-18
(2006) (compiling definitions).
26
See David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word,
Darfur, and the UN Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 303-07 (2006) (arguing that a
definitional gap caused newspapers to misrepresent the “no genocide” conclusion of the
UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur).
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27

discourse.
Even William Schabas—perhaps the most
prominent defender today of the Conventional definition—rests
his defense on the way crimes against humanity has expanded
since Nuremberg to cover vital territory the Convention leaves
28
untouched. Other defenders of the genocide concept, like
David Luban, advocate amendments extending its reach to
29
extermination of civilians. Leila Sadat recently led a group of
scholars in drafting a proposed treaty on crimes against
humanity. Her project seems motivated, at least in substantial
part, by concern about genocide: the Conventional definition
does not reach many victims of atrocities, but the word so
captures the public imagination as to hinder effective action on
behalf of those victims. Sadat calls this the “obstacle of
semantic indifference” and blames it for “the victimization of
30
millions of human beings.”
How should one assess proposals, like those of Luban or
Sadat, to change what genocide means or how it is used?
Because past is prologue, a proper foundation for policy
discourse about genocide’s future should start at the very
beginning—with Lemkin.
Lemkin’s coinage of genocide was instrumental, a means
to an end. The term played a central role in his strategy to
change the way the world saw and treated the Nazis and
perpetrators of similar crimes. It was conceived to “build the
31
law,” to induce the nations of the world to change international
27

Among the many possible entry points into this literature, see generally
David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 229
(2006) (advocating use of “precursors of genocide” and “atrocity crimes”); Symposium, 2
GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 31 (2007) (articles by Schabas, Minow, Garibian,
Bazyler, Mennecke, Akhavan, Leven, and Scheffer); Gareth Evans, Crimes Against
Humanity: Overcoming Indifference, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 325 (2006) (arguing to replace
genocide as the trigger for intervention with crimes against humanity or Scheffer’s
“atrocity crimes”); Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26
WHITTIER L. REV. 1101 (2005) (arguing that genocide should be irrelevant to questions
about whether to intervene).
28
See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 642-47, 653-54.
29
See Luban, supra note 26, at 319-20.
30
LEILA SADAT, A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY 7-8 (2010).
31
Rosenthal writes:
We would say to him: Lemkin, what good will it do to write mass murder
down as a crime; will a piece of paper stop a new Hitler or Stalin? Then he
put aside cajolery and his face stiffened. “Only man has law. Law must be
built, do you understand me? You must build the law!”
Rosenthal, supra note 1; cf. Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J.
1142, 1157 (1949) [hereinafter Yale Commentary] (“Compared with established

556

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:2

law, their own domestic laws, and their social norms of
acceptable state behavior. It was, in short, rhetoric.
Rhetoric is often described as the “practical art” of
persuasion.32 To better understand the Genocide Convention
from the perspective of the man most responsible for it, this
article draws from the ancient discipline of rhetoric to ask,
Whom did Lemkin want to persuade to do what, and why did he
choose this particular means of persuasion? To address these
questions, this article applies rhetorical theory—in particular,
Lloyd Bitzer’s idea of the “rhetorical situation”—to a reading of
nine texts Lemkin published in English during the key period
between Axis Rule in 1944 and the Genocide Convention in
33
1948 : Axis Rule; articles in the American Journal of
International Law, American Scholar, the Christian Science
Monitor, Free World, the Nation, and the United Nations
34
Bulletin; and two letters to the editor in the New York Times.
This article makes two contributions to the debate about
the meaning and value of genocide. First, it offers a new
conception of genocide as rhetoric. This conception opens the
door to importing insights from rhetorical scholarship into the
genocide debate. It describes Lemkin’s rhetorical situation—
particularly the problem for which he saw genocide as the
solution—and assesses his rhetorical strategy. By focusing on
Lemkin as an advocate, Bitzer’s prism reveals the extent of

standards of national penal enforcement, the Convention might seem an instrument of
pioneer justice; but these are pioneer days in world law. Perhaps this is the kind of
quasi-law from which effective world law may be expected eventually to develop.”). One
bibliography identifies Lemkin as “a contributor” to this Commentary. See Jim Fussell,
Comprehensive Bibliography: Writings of Raphael Lemkin, PREVENT GENOCIDE,
http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/bibliography.htm (last updated May 26, 2001).
The bibliography does not explain this conclusion, but it seems plausible: Lemkin was
working at Yale Law School at the time, see, e.g., JOHN COOPER, RAPHAEL LEMKIN AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 119 (2008), and the Commentary
closely tracks some arguments Lemkin had made elsewhere. See generally Yale
Commentary, supra.
32
See infra Part II.
33
After UN approval of the Genocide Convention, Lemkin’s rhetorical
situation shifted fundamentally from establishing and promoting the concept of
genocide to securing ratification of the Convention. For a possible example of Lemkin’s
turn to his ratification project, see Yale Commentary, supra note 31, at 1151-56.
34
Given the focus here on work published in English, additional research
might be done on the extent to which Lemkin’s archival materials and his writings in
other languages further illuminate his rhetorical situation. See generally Tanya Elder,
What You See Before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemkin’s Life by Exploring His
Archival Papers, 1900–1959, 7 J. GENOCIDE RES. 469, 472 (2005) (surveying the
archival materials available); see also COOPER, supra note 31, at 78, 149 (referencing
articles Lemkin published in Belgian, French, and Norwegian law journals in 1946 and
in Le Monde in 1948).
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Lemkin’s ambition and achievement: he helped to create
modern international law. Second, this article provides an
example of how a Lemkinian understanding of genocide can
inform the construction of the Convention on pressing matters
of contemporary controversy. Specifically, it points to a better
understanding of the Convention’s intent requirement than
that underpinning the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’s
35
“no genocide” conclusion.
Part I introduces Lemkin and his genocide project. Part
II introduces Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, and Parts III and IV
apply that prism to genocide. Part V assesses Lemkin’s
rhetorical strategy. Part VI discusses the significance of
understanding Lemkin’s rhetorical situation to the Genocide
Convention and to ongoing debates about the role of genocide
in our international legal order and thereby also illustrates
36
how legal scholarship may better utilize Bitzer’s ideas. The
article then concludes.
I.

RAPHAEL LEMKIN AND HIS GENOCIDE PROJECT

A.

Background to Genocide

Lemkin’s biographers depict him as having both
personal experience with, and intellectual interests in, atrocity
37
and violence from an early age. Jews in a nearby town
suffered a murderous pogrom when Lemkin was about five
years old. During World War I, Lemkin’s childhood home was
destroyed, much of his family’s property was seized, and his
brother Samuel died of illness and malnourishment. As a child,
Lemkin read “an unusually grim reading list” about “historical
38
cases of mass slaughter.”

35

Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral ¶¶ 513-18 (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.
36
Bitzer’s work has been underappreciated in legal literature. Among the
handful of U.S. law review articles that draw on his work, see generally Leigh Hunt
Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U.
L. REV. 861 (1995) (arguing, from an example of rhetorical situation analysis of Marbury
v. Madison, that law schools should integrate legal writing courses with substantive
courses); Linda Levine & Kurt Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL ED. 108
(1993) (arguing that law schools should train students in rhetoric, including rhetorical
situation analysis); Robert Prentice, Supreme Court Rhetoric, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 85 (1983)
(applying rhetorical situation analysis to Brown v. Board of Education).
37
POWER, supra note 9, at 20-21; accord COOPER, supra note 31, at 1-13;
WILLIAM KOREY, AN EPITAPH FOR RAPHAEL LEMKIN 4-6 (2001).
38
POWER, supra note 9, at 20.
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Lemkin studied law and philology as a university
student in Lvov, Poland. A news article caught his attention in
1921. It described the trial in Germany of Soghomon Tehlirian,
an Armenian who had assassinated Mehmed Talaat for his
leadership of the Ottoman slaughter of Armenians. Lemkin
noted the inconsistency between trying Tehlirian for the
murder of one man when Talaat had escaped prosecution for
39
the murder of “more than a million men.” On the other hand,
Lemkin could not approve of individual vengeance as the
appropriate response. Instead, he sought to make the Talaats
40
of the world stand trial for their crimes.
To this end, in 1933, Lemkin proposed to an
international legal conference in Madrid the adoption and
41
universal prosecution of two crimes: barbarity and vandalism.
Lemkin defined barbarity as an action taken “out of hatred
towards a racial, religious or social collectivity or with the goal of
its extermination . . . against the life, the bodily integrity,
liberty, dignity or the economic existence of a person belonging
to such a collectivity.”42 He defined vandalism as an action, taken
with the same motive, which “destroys works of cultural or
43
artistic heritage.” Although Lemkin regarded Hitler’s ascension
to power that year as an urgent justification to legislate against
these crimes, at least some participants in Madrid deemed his
proposal irrelevant to a Europe years removed from the First
44
World War. The conference “tabled” Lemkin’s proposal.
The failure of barbarity and vandalism informed
Lemkin’s later effort to coin and promote genocide. Lemkin

39

Id. at 17 (quoting Lemkin).
Id. at 2-19.
41
The Madrid conference was the fifth in a series of intergovernmental
meetings to promote international cooperation on criminal matters. It was hosted by
the Spanish government and attended mainly by states. The conference adopted texts
on arms, family abandonment, prostitution, and terrorism. The conference was
organized in cooperation with the League of Nations, but states that were not members
of the League (such as the United States) also participated. See generally ACTES DE LA
CONFERÉNCE, V CONFERÉNCE INTERNATIONALE POUR L’UNIFICATION DU DROIT PÉNAL
(1935); Report of the Secretary General on Penal and Penitentiary Questions, League of
Nations Doc. A.14.1934.IV, at 7 (1934) (summarizing the conference results). Lemkin’s
proposal is printed in French in the ACTES DE LA CONFERÉNCE, supra, at 48. I have relied
on James Fussell’s unofficial English translation. Acts Constituting a General
(Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations, PREVENT
GENOCIDE, http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm (last visited
Feb. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Lemkin, Madrid Proposal].
42
Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, proposed art. 1.
43
Id. art. 2.
44
See POWER, supra note 9, at 21-22.
40

E
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learned not to rely on existing words to define new crimes.
Instead, according to Samantha Power:

45

Lemkin saw he needed a word that could not be used in other
contexts (as “barbarity” and “vandalism” could). He self-consciously
sought one that would bring with it “a color of freshness and novelty”
while describing something “as shortly and as poignantly as
possible.” . . . Somehow it had to chill listeners and invite immediate
condemnation.46

B.

Axis Rule and Other Lemkin Texts

Early in World War II, Lemkin escaped from invaded
Poland to Lithuania and then Sweden. A professor at Duke
Law School with whom he had collaborated then helped
Lemkin receive both permission to immigrate to the United
States and an appointment at Duke. Lemkin journeyed across
Russia, the Pacific, and North America to reach Duke. In the
summer of 1942, Lemkin left Duke for Washington to consult
47
with the U.S. Board of Economic Warfare. Lemkin started
writing Axis Rule in Sweden in 1940, continued his work at
48
Duke, and ultimately finished the book in Washington.
Axis Rule is “a catalogue raisonné of Nazi legislation in
49
occupied territory.” The bulk of the book consists of a countryby-country litany of German actions in nineteen occupied
territories, supported by a compilation of “statutes, decrees,
and other documents” translated into English. The book begins,
however, with “a rational synthesis”—a relatively short
50
overview—of “German techniques of occupation.” Chapter IX,
entitled “Genocide,” is the last chapter of this overview.
Lemkin presents his word in this passage:
By “genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic
group. . . . [G]enocide does not necessarily mean the immediate
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of
all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating
the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be
disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture,
45

LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79 (“New conceptions require new terms.”).
POWER, supra note 9, at 42 (quoting Lemkin). Lemkin drew on George
Eastman’s explanation for the name Kodak: “First. It is short. Second. It is not capable
of mispronunciation. Third. It does not resemble anything in the art . . . .” Id. at 41-42.
47
See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 383.
48
See LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiv.
49
Luban, supra note 26, at 307.
50
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at ix.
46
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language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of
national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty,
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such
groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity,
and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their
individual capacity, but as members of the national group.51

Genocide thus brings together elements of Lemkin’s barbarity
52
and vandalism in a single new concept. With Axis Rule,
Lemkin “renew[ed]” his effort to create a new international
53
crime. For example, given the opportunity to write a one-page
memorandum to Franklin Roosevelt, Lemkin urged the
54
President to negotiate a treaty banning genocide.
After Axis Rule, Lemkin vigorously promoted genocide and
his proposal for a treaty outlawing it. By the time the United
Nations approved the Genocide Convention, Lemkin had written
numerous articles advocating this action, testified before
55
Congress in support of “war crimes” prosecutions, consulted with
56
the Nuremberg prosecutors, wrote the first draft of General
Assembly Resolution 96(I), served on the UN experts committee
57
that prepared the first draft of the Genocide Convention, gave
speeches, and lobbied diplomats and journalists.

51

Id. at 79; see also id. at xi (previewing genocide in a summary of the book’s

contents).
52

Despite many similarities between genocide and its forerunners, there are
meaningful differences. For example, Lemkin does not repeat in Axis Rule the specific
motive requirement (“out of hatred”) that he had specified for barbarity and vandalism.
See generally id.; cf. Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, proposed arts. 1-2.
53
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiii (“[T]he author [made] a proposal . . . in
Madrid in 1933 . . . that an international treaty should be negotiated declaring that attacks
upon national, religious, and ethnic groups should be made international crimes . . . . His
proposal not having been adopted at that time, he feels impelled to renew it now . . . .”); see
also Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 145,
148 (1947) [hereinafter Lemkin, AJIL] (describing his work on G.A. Res. 96 (I) as a “return
to the postulates submitted . . . in Madrid in 1933”).
54
See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 383. I have not been able
to locate Lemkin’s memorandum to Roosevelt or further details about it. James Fussell has
reported his own unsuccessful efforts to find the same memorandum at the Roosevelt
archive in Hyde Park. See James Fussell, Lemkin’s War: Origins of the Term “Genocide,”
Speech at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (Mar. 11, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/analysis/details.php?content=2003-03-11). On the gaps in
Lemkin’s archives, see generally Elder, supra note 34.
55
See Punishment of War Criminals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Foreign Aff. On H. J. Res. 93, 79th Cong. 61-62 (1945) (statement of Raphael Lemkin)
[hereinafter Lemkin Statement] (advocating prosecution of “extermination of peoples”
without mentioning the word genocide).
56
See Barrett, supra note 12, at 47-51 (describing a limited and somewhat
strained arrangement).
57
See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 60-64, 77.
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Public revulsion against war created a “Grotian
58
moment,” when there was a public hunger to build a new
international legal order committed to collective security and
59
human rights. Lemkin reached official circles in Washington
in 1942 and published Axis Rule in 1944, both early enough to
60
participate in this creative moment. He had the idea, the
61
rhetorical strategy, the energy, the talent, the timing, and the
gumption to contribute genocide to the postwar agenda—and
then the will and the stamina to persevere across the
increasingly harsh terrain of the Cold War. By the time
Resolution 96(I) passed, Winston Churchill had given his “iron
curtain” speech; by the time the Genocide Convention opened
for signature, the Soviets had boycotted the Marshall Plan, the
Berlin blockade and airlift were underway, and the red star
had risen over Czechoslovakia and much of mainland China; by
the time the Convention entered into effect, China had crossed
62
the Yalu into the Korean War.
After the Convention entered into force, Lemkin
63
continued to devote himself to securing ratifications. At his
death in August 1959, the Convention had sixty-one state
64
parties.

58

I borrow the phrase from Michael Scharf’s Grotian Moment blog but extend it
beyond significant “legal developments” within international law to encompass
transformative political developments reshaping that law. See GROTIAN MOMENT: THE
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL BLOG, http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/
index.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
59
See, e.g., Atlantic Charter, Official Statement on Meeting Between the
President and Prime Minister Churchill (Aug. 14, 1941), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp (describing the “common principles” on which
Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill “base their hopes for a better future for the
world”); Decl. by the U.N. (Jan. 1, 1942), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
20th_century/decade03.asp (committing to the Atlantic Charter); Moscow Decl. of the
Four Nations on General Security (Oct. 30, 1943), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
wwii/moscow.asp [hereinafter Moscow Declaration] (“recogniz[ing] the necessity of
establishing . . . a general international organization . . . for the international peace and
security”); U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 1-2, 39-51 (establishing arrangements aimed at
collective security).
60
See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 383; Barrett, supra note
12, at 38.
61
Notably, a talent for language. See, e.g., Raphael Lemkin, Genocide Foe,
Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1959 (Lemkin “was fluent in nine languages”).
62
See generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY (2005).
63
See POWER, supra note 9, at 61-78.
64
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
UNTS ONLINE, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid
=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (last visited Feb. 1, 2012)
[hereinafter UNTS Online] (adjusted for UN membership in 1959 (e.g., counting China
and Vietnam as parties from the dates their “Republics” adhered, rather than the later
dates of their “People’s Republics”)).
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BITZER’S RHETORICAL SITUATION

Before examining Lemkin’s coinage of genocide as
rhetoric, we must pause to introduce the discipline of rhetoric,
especially Bitzer’s idea of the rhetorical situation.
In On Rhetoric, Aristotle defines his subject as “an
65
ability . . . to see the available means of persuasion.”
Accordingly, rhetoric is often described as the “practical art” of
66
67
persuasion. It is “an art of emphasis” or a “science of human
68
attention-structures.” It is “not concerned with permanence,
69
nor yet with beauty. It is concerned with effect.” It “helps to
produce or solicit judgments or decisions regarding practical
70
issues and pressing public problems.” In the words of Francis
Bacon, “The duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to
71
imagination for the better moving of the will.” Accordingly,
Bitzer observes, “[A] work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes
into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it
functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it
72
performs some task.”
Bitzer introduces the concept of the rhetorical
73
situation. He argues that this concept is crucial, because “a
rhetorical situation must exist as a necessary condition of
rhetorical discourse, just as a question must exist as a
74
necessary condition of an answer.” He defines a rhetorical
65

ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 2.1 (George
Kennedy, trans., 1991). Kennedy explains that his translation renders “to grasp the
meaning or utility of . . . what is inherently and potentially persuasive in the facts,
circumstances, character of the speaker, attitude of the audience, etc.” Id. at 36 n.34
(internal quotation marks omitted).
66
See, e.g., RICHARD LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 132 (2d ed.
1991); cf. WHITE, supra note 2, at xi-xii, 28 (describing rhetoric as “that art by which
culture and community and character are constituted and transformed,” which
includes but also exceeds “the art of persuading others”).
67
JAMES JASINSKI, SOURCEBOOK ON RHETORIC: KEY CONCEPTS IN
CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL STUDIES 12 (2001) (quoting Richard Weaver, Language Is
Sermonic, in CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF RHETORIC: SELECTED READINGS 173 (R.L.
Johannesen ed., 1971)).
68
LANHAM, supra note 66, at 134.
69
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 191 (quoting H.A. Wichelns, The Literary
Criticism of Oratory, in STUDIES IN RHETORIC AND PUBLIC SPEAKING IN HONOR OF
JAMES ALBERT WINANS, 209 (A. M. Drummond ed., 1925)).
70
Id. at 192.
71
LANHAM, supra note 66, at 131.
72
Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 3-4 (1968).
73
See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 514.
74
Bitzer, supra note 72, at 5-6. Bitzer originally presented the rhetorical
situation as an objective fact to which speakers respond, but critics argued that speakers
have a constitutive role in creating and defining the rhetorical situation, prompting
Bitzer to acknowledge that a speaker’s “thoughts” are “parts of historical reality,” that is,
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situation “as a complex of persons, events, objects, and
relations presenting an actual or potential exigence[,] which
can be completely or partially removed if discourse . . . can so
constrain human decision or action as to bring about the
75
significant modification of the exigence.” Bitzer identifies the
“three constituents of any rhetorical situation”: the exigence,
the audience, and “the constraints which influence the rhetor
76
and can be brought to bear upon the audience.”
First, an exigence “is a defect, an obstacle, something
77
waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be.”
It “is the necessary condition of a rhetorical situation. If there
were no exigence, there would be nothing to require or invite
78
change. . . . [T]he exigence provides motive.” Not all exigences
are rhetorical. Aristotle explains that the “political
orator . . . does not deal with all things, but only
with . . . . [those matters] which we have it in our power to set
79
going.” Ralph Waldo Emerson concurs: “You [might be] a very
80
elegant writer, but you can’t write up what gravitates down.”
Thus, to be rhetorical, an exigence must be capable of change
(unlike death or gravity)—and discourse must be capable of
81
effecting or assisting that change. Bitzer identifies air
pollution as a rhetorical exigence, because the reduction of
pollution “strongly invites the assistance of discourse producing
82
public awareness, indignation, and action of the right kind.”
Second, a rhetorical audience “consists only of those
persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of

of the rhetorical situation. See Lloyd F. Bitzer, Functional Communication: A Situational
Perspective, in RHETORIC IN TRANSITION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE AND USES OF RHETORIC
21, 25 (Eugene E. White ed., 1980) [hereinafter Bitzer, Functional Communication];
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 516-17 (noting that “[m]ost rhetorical scholars” conclude that
discourse both “responds to [and] creates situations”).
75
Bitzer, supra note 72, at 6.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Bitzer, Functional Communication, supra note 74, at 26.
79
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 160 (quoting ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1359a311359a39 (W.R. Roberts trans., 1954)).
80
Id. at 159 (quoting 8 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Eloquence, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 109, 131 (1904)).
81
See Bitzer, supra note 72, at 6-7. White illustrates the distinction in his
discussion of Sophocles’ Philoctetes, in which Odysseus and Neoptolemus seek to
retrieve Heracles’ magic bow from Philoctetes to satisfy a prophecy. See WHITE, supra
note 2, at 3-27. They learn, however, that the prophecy requires not only the bow, but
the voluntary participation of Philoctetes. Id. While force or trickery might obtain the
bow itself, the owner’s free cooperation can be achieved only through discourse—thus
presenting a rhetorical exigence. Id.
82
Bitzer, supra note 72, at 6-7.
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83

being mediators of change.” The audience must have open
minds and must be “capable of making the final decision” or
“capable of influencing those with final decision-making
84
authority.” Following this distinction, in democratic politics, a
rhetorical audience includes the public as a whole, because the
public is capable of influencing the government’s agenda,
priorities, and outcomes.
Third, rhetorical constraints are those “parts of the
situation . . . [that] have the power to constrain decision and
action needed to modify the exigence,” and they typically include
“beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images,
85
interests, motives and the like.” Constraints are “circumstances
that interfere with . . . an advocate’s ability to respond to an
exigence. . . . Circumstantial constraints are, in effect, miniexigences; they are secondary problems that an advocate must
86
negotiate or deal with to resolve the dominant exigence.”
Finally, just as circumstances may present obstacles for
a speaker to overcome, they may also supply “material that can
87
work to the advocate’s advantage.” Accordingly, in later work,
Bitzer adds rhetorical resources as another element of the
88
rhetorical situation.
As a simple example of a rhetorical exercise, children
may attempt to persuade their parents (i.e., their rhetorical
audience) to raise their allowances. In making this effort, the
children will have to persuade their parents that there is an
89
“exigence”—“a thing which is other than it should be.” The
children share this challenge—they must establish the existence
of a problem as a precondition to persuading the audience to
adopt a solution—with many advocates. “[D]efining the situation
often is the most fundamental exigence faced by advocates. It is
83

Id. at 8. Aristotle identifies three species of rhetoric depending whether the
audience is a decision-maker or spectator (as in a eulogy) and, if the former, whether
the decision concerns past events (as in a trial) or future events (as in policy
deliberations). See ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at 47; see also George Kennedy,
Introduction, in ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at 15.
84
See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 515 (discussing R.E. Crable & S.L. Vibbert,
Managing Issues and Influencing Public Policy, 6 PUB. REL. REV. 3 (1985)).
85
Bitzer, supra note 72, at 8.
86
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 516.
87
Id.
88
Id. More precisely, Bitzer came to acknowledge that “constraints” include
“opportunities” as well as “limitations,” and that “[t]he rhetor’s central creative task is
to discover and make use of proper constraints,” i.e., the available resources, in order to
navigate the limitations and persuade the audience. Bitzer, Functional
Communication, supra note 74, at 23-24.
89
Bitzer, supra note 72, at 6-7.
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virtually impossible to persuade an audience to adopt a policy
90
proposal if audience members do not perceive a need.” Rahm
Emanuel expresses the same insight in his maxim: “You never
want a serious crisis to go to waste. . . . [I]t’s an opportunity to
91
do things you could not do before.”
The children in our example likely enjoy many
advantages often lacked by political advocates, such as direct
access to the ultimate decision-makers; an ability to command
the decision-makers’ attention; an audience well-disposed to
the advocates (if not to their arguments); and a proposed
solution that many decision-makers can implement without
excessive burden. Political advocates act in a world with
“simultaneous rhetorical situations,” which compete for the
92
attention of the same audience at the same time. Political
advocates will struggle to persuade even sympathetic decisionmakers and members of the public that their concerns warrant
attention and action. In other words, political advocates will
often find that their main obstacle is “inertia” and their main
93
task is “to energize and activate audiences.”
Our hypothetical children will likely assert that their
current allowance fails to meet their needs and appeal,
expressly or implicitly, to parental duty and desire to address
their children’s needs. Our hypothetical parents, in turn, will
likely give meaningful consideration to this value of
helpfulness. But the parents will likely consider other values as
well, such as the parental obligation to teach patience, thrift,
and work ethic. Thus, the parents’ decision whether to raise
the allowance requires “balancing or negotiating competing
94
principles.” Public matters that present similar tensions
between competing principles, known as “prudential
95
are often resolved by constructing “value
dilemmas,”
hierarchies”; significantly, such hierarchies are not permanent,
because later advocates may contest them with new
96
circumstances, concepts, distinctions, or priorities.

90

JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 158, 517.
See David Leonhardt, The Big Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, (Magazine), at
22 (quoting “Rahm’s Doctrine”).
92
See Bitzer, supra note 72, at 12.
93
See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 458, 519.
94
Id. at 522.
95
Id.
96
See id. at 522, 597-98.
91
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LEMKIN’S EXIGENCE

Tehlirian’s assassination of Talaat, as mentioned,
sparked Lemkin’s interest in developing an international legal
97
regime for mass atrocity. When Lemkin asked one of his
professors why Talaat had not been prosecuted for Ottoman
crimes against Armenians, the professor responded: “Consider
the case of a farmer who owns a flock of chickens. He kills them
98
and this is his business. If you interfere, you are trespassing.”
Lemkin’s professor thus interposed the norms of
sovereignty and nonintervention as a bar to external prosecution
of crimes committed by a state within its territory against its
own nationals. To achieve his objective of international
criminalization, Lemkin had to overcome this bar. This was his
rhetorical exigence. To understand it, this section will first
introduce the concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention.
A.

A Brief Introduction to Sovereignty

The International Court of Justice has called
sovereignty “the fundamental principle . . . on which the whole
99
of international law rests.” Its “core meaning” might be said to
100
be “supreme authority within a territory.” Yet any such
definition necessarily oversimplifies the extent to which the
word’s true content and significance have been (and remain)
101
unclear, contested, and changeable. Lassa Oppenheim traces
the history of the word sovereignty from its introduction by
Bodin in 1577, concluding “there is not and never was
102
unanimity regarding this conception.” Some scholars thus
97

See supra Part I.A.
POWER, supra note 9, at 17.
99
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 263 (June 27).
100
Dan Philpott, Sovereignty, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer ed. 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2010/entries/sovereignty/.
101
Indeed, Philpott goes on to discuss historical and contemporary challenges
to this definition. Id.
102
L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 111-15 (2d ed. 1912); cf.
LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 9 (1995) (attributing
difficulties with sovereignty, in part, to the word’s emergence from “the misty
antecedents of the modern international system” in “inter-prince relations” before
Westphalia); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 866 (1990) (“Since Aristotle, the term
‘sovereignty’ has had a long and varied history during which it has been given different
meanings, hues and tones, depending on the context and the objectives of those using
the word.”); James N. Rosenau, Sovereignty in a Turbulent World, in BEYOND
98
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suggest that sovereignty is too vague a word, too steeped in
103
myth and mysticism, for practical use in the modern world.
To appreciate Lemkin’s rhetorical situation, it is
important to introduce sovereignty as it was seen between the
world wars. Some indication can be found in the 1927 Lotus
case, where France claimed that international law barred
Turkey from asserting jurisdiction over French sailors on board
a French ship for colliding with a Turkish ship on the high
seas. The Permanent Court ruled for Turkey and declared,
The rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own
free will. . . . Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
therefore be presumed. . . . [A]ll that can be required of a State is
that it should not overstep the limits which international law places
upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise
jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.104

The Lotus Court thus revealed a conception of sovereignty as
freedom from external constraint—except only those
international legal obligations consented-to by the state’s “own
free will.” Robert Lansing, the U.S. Secretary of State during
World War I, revealed a similar conception in his remark that
“[t]he essence of sovereignty [is] the absence of
105
responsibility.” Gareth Evans and Akhil Amar nicely capture
this notion of sovereignty in their respective quips that
106
“sovereignty is a license to kill” and “[s]overeignty means
107
never having to say you’re sorry.”

WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 191 (Gene M.
Lyons & Michael Mastaduno eds., 1995) (proposing a “turbulence model” of constant
competition along a “sovereignty continuum”).
103
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 102, at 10-12, 100-01 (proposing to abandon
the word sovereignty in favor of a “decompose[d]” list of the “essential characteristics
and indicia of statehood today”); W. Michael Reisman, International Law and
Organization for a New World Order: The Uppsala Model, General Report of JUS 1981,
in THE SPIRIT OF UPPSALA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT UNITAR-UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER 27, 3132 (Atle Grahl-Madsen & Jiri Toman eds., 1984) (“I suggest we eschew the term
[sovereignty] and address ourselves to the empirical questions which are really at
issue.”); Richard Lillich, Sovereignty and Humanity: Can They Converge?, in THE
SPIRIT OF UPPSALA, supra, at 406 (“[T]he concept of sovereignty . . . is an idea whose
time has come and gone.”).
104
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7)
[hereinafter The Lotus]. Even here, however, the extent of contestation over sovereignty
is revealed: the court split, six-to-six, with the judgment decided solely by a tiebreaking rule. See id. at 33.
105
POWER, supra note 9, at 14.
106
Evans, supra note 27, at 331.
107
AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 336 (2005).
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The Lotus decision and the Permanent Court itself
should be seen in the context of the international political order
created after the Great War. This order arose from the
upheaval the War had wrought in the prior political order,
including the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German, and
Ottoman Empires; the Soviet Revolution; a radical new balance
of power; the redrawing of European borders; and the
emergence of new European states together with the modern
108
vocabulary of self-determination. And the new order aimed
toward one paramount (and ultimately failed) objective:
avoiding another world war.
Mark Janis describes the interwar period as a “time of
109
state-centric high positivism.” Norms emerged that favored
consolidating notions of statehood, protecting weaker states,
and encouraging cooperation amongst states. For example, the
Inter-American Montevideo Convention of 1933 ascribes to
each state the following rights: “integrity and independence”;
juridical equality and “equal capacity” with other states;
jurisdiction over all inhabitants within its territory (including
foreign nationals); territorial inviolability; and the rights “to
organize itself as it sees fit” and “to legislate upon its
110
It also provides, “No state has the right to
interests.”
111
intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”
Without
defining
sovereignty,
the
Montevideo
Convention reveals its essential content—as seen by its
authors during the interwar years. It regards nonintervention
as vital to sovereignty. In this, it resonates with the Lotus
decision: “Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by
international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of
a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power

108

See MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY, at xxi,
473-536, 580-82 (1994) (describing the end of the war and its effects on the twentieth
century); WALTER CONSUALO LANGSAM, THE WORLD SINCE 1914, at 116-19 (5th ed. 1943).
109
MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS, 1776-1939, at
208 (2010).
110
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States arts. 3, 4, 9, 11,
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
111
Id. art. 8. The American states reaffirmed this bar on intervention three
years later. See Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, done at Buenos
Aires, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 41; see also R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 113 (1974) (“What was remarkable [about the Buenos Aires
Protocol] was that the United States should bind herself by treaty to the observation of
an apparently absolute rule of nonintervention, allowing none of the exceptions with
which she had increasingly indulged herself.”).
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112

in any form in the territory of another State.”
Schabas
describes this view of sovereignty as “a form of quid pro quo by
which States agreed, in effect, to mind their own business.
What went on within the borders of a sovereign State was a
113
matter that concerned nobody but the State itself.”
Recalling the contested nature of sovereignty, however,
some developments should be noted that pushed against the
era’s dominant state-centric trend. The Treaty of Versailles
obliged defeated states and new states, over their sovereignty114
based objections, to respect the rights of minorities. Versailles
also created the International Labor Organization to address
domestic labor conditions, premised in part on “sentiments of
115
justice and humanity.” The Institut de Droit International
produced a Declaration of the International Rights of Man to
116
The
constrain states’ treatment of their own nationals.
International Law Association called for the establishment of an
International Criminal Court with “jurisdiction over all offenses
committed contrary to the laws of humanity and the dictates of
public conscience”; this proposal generated enough state interest
to produce a draft convention, which then withered in the face of
117
war. Successive editions of the Oppenheim treatise render a
verdict on the limited impact these developments had on the
112

The Lotus, supra note 104, at 18; accord League of Nations Covenant art.
10 (protecting “territorial integrity and . . . political independence”); id. art. 15, para. 8
(barring the League from making any recommendations to settle a dispute found to
“arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of [one] party”); Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (The
Saavedra Lamas Treaty) art. II, Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat. 3363 (“[T]erritorial questions
must not be settled by violence . . . .”).
113
SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 2.
114
See, e.g., Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Germany art. 93, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]
(obliging Poland to enter a treaty “to protect the interests of inhabitants of Poland who
differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion”). See generally
I LASSA OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 650-55 (Hersch Lauterpacht
ed., 7th ed. 1948) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, I OPPENHEIM’S 7TH]; Thomas
Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
783, 783-85 (2006) (discussing interwar minority protections as precedent to modern
human rights law).
115
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, pmbl., June 28,
1919, 49 Stat. 2712.
116
Institut de Droit International, Decl. of the Int’l Rights of Man, Oct. 12,
1929, reprinted in George Finch, The International Rights of Man, 35 AM. J. INT’L L.
662, 663-64 (1941); see also Phillip Marshall Brown, The New York Session of the
Institut de Droit International, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 127 (1930) (describing the
Declaration as “a revolutionary document” that “marks a new era which is more
concerned with the interests and rights of sovereign individuals than with the rights of
sovereign states”).
117
JANIS, supra note 109, at 207-11.
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state of the law: the treatise moved from dismissing “so-called
rights of mankind” outright as nonexistent and inconsistent
118
with the nature of international law to acknowledging the
existence of some relevant state practice that was “not without
significance” but did not yet have “the legal effect of
incorporating the fundamental rights of man as part of the
119
positive law of nations.”
B.

A Brief Introduction to Nonintervention
120

The nonintervention norm protects sovereignty. Like
sovereignty itself, it is contested. In the words of Louis Henkin,
“[T]he norm against intervention . . . is difficult to define, to
121
separate the permissible from the impermissible . . . .” Once
again, time and politics have contributed to ambiguity and
change. “The frontiers protected by the principle of
nonintervention are unclear at any one time, they vary over
time, and they are defined differently by different statesmen—
Castlereagh or Palmerston, Theodore or Franklin Roosevelt,
122
Khrushchev or Brezhnev.”
Two issues arise about the interwar scope of the
nonintervention norm. Did the norm extend beyond military
intervention to prohibiting criticism and other nonmilitary
interference (a word sometimes used to distinguish such acts
from military intervention)? And was the norm limited so as to
permit intervention for humanitarian purposes in certain
circumstances? Ellery Stowell’s 1921 treatise on Intervention in
International Law provides abundant evidence that both issues
123
were contested.

118

OPPENHEIM, supra note 102, at 367-69; I LASSA OPPENHEIM’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 461-63 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1920)
[hereinafter ROXBURGH, OPPENHEIM’S 3d].
119
LAUTERPACHT, I OPPENHEIM’S 7TH, supra note 114, at 583-85.
120
See VINCENT, supra note 111, at 14 (“The function . . . of nonintervention . . . [is]
protecting the principle of state sovereignty.”); HENKIN, supra note 102, at 110 (“All states
insist on the norm of non-intervention, but it is the favorite norm of the weak and the small, an
expression of their equality as well as a safeguard of their independence and autonomy.”). See
generally Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L.,
www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e1434&
recno=1&author=Kunig%20%20Philip (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
121
HENKIN, supra note 102, at 110.
122
VINCENT, supra note 111, at 15-16; see also id. at 139 (“[I]t might be more
accurate to refer to American doctrines of nonintervention than to one doctrine . . . .”).
123
See generally ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1921). We know that Lemkin was familiar with Stowell’s work, at least by the 1950s,
because he discusses it in an unfinished manuscript. See Raphael Lemkin, Introduction
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First, Stowell gives examples showing that states
sometimes overcome the pull of nonintervention to criticize
internal affairs in other states. Even these examples
demonstrate, however, that the nonintervention norm exerted
some degree of influence. The norm manifested itself in the
(predictable) reactions of the criticized states and in the ways
124
that the criticizing states calibrated, justified, and portrayed
their comments. For instance, in 1882, the U.S. government
authorized a diplomat to “express the hope” that Russia “will
find means . . . to cease” the mistreatment of its Jewish
population, but no more and only that much “with all proper
deference” and “if a favorable opportunity offers” in the
125
diplomat’s “wide discretion.” By contrast, these instructions
continued, if U.S. citizens are injured by Russian persecution,
126
“you will feel it your duty to omit no effort to protect them.”
Second, Stowell argues for a humanitarian limit on the
127
He lists authorities supporting
norm of nonintervention.
humanitarian intervention (including Grotius) and opponents
128
(including Vattel). He describes “Turkey’s persecutions of the
Armenians” as an instance when “the United States has felt
constrained by the obligations of a common humanity to intervene
129
diplomatically.” Even as Stowell presents it, however, the U.S.
comments were limited to “‘merely . . . informing Turkey that the
American people already [we]re so stirred by the reported
massacres that a continuance of the atrocities might [have]
result[ed] in a break in the friendly relations between the two
peoples,’” because the reports “‘caus[ed] unfriendly criticism
130
among the people of the United States.’” A fuller picture shows
the ways in which the nonintervention norm (together with the
U.S. interest in staying neutral in World War I) constrained the
to the Study of Genocide 60-64, published in STEVEN JACOBS, LEMKIN ON GENOCIDE
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Lemkin, Introduction].
124
Cf. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND
THE ROLE OF LAW 26 (1974) (“Do we believe that the behaviour of a man travelling 65 miles
an hour on a super-highway with a 60-mile speed-limit was not constrained by law?”).
125
STOWELL, supra note 123, at 73-76 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(printing the instructions given to the American Chargé at St. Petersburg).
126
Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
See id. at 51-62. Stowell argues that intervention, even the “reliance upon
force,” may be allowed “for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of
another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to
exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with
reason and justice.” Id. at 53 (citation omitted).
128
Id. at 53-59.
129
Id. at 80.
130
Id. at 81-82 (quoting a report printed in the N.Y. EVENING POST, Oct. 5, 1915).
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U.S. response. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Sr. led the
push for U.S. action that “may possibly have the effect of
checking [Turkey’s] Government and certainly provide an
opportunity for efficient relief,” notwithstanding “the principles
of non-interference with the internal affairs of another
131
Washington approved a limited criticism of
country.”
Ottoman atrocities, but no actions capable of effectively
“checking,” or providing “efficient relief” from, those atrocities.
Stowell considers humanitarian intervention legal and
132
By contrast,
criticizes states that fail to embrace it.
Oppenheim writes that, although supported by “[m]any jurists”
and some instances of state practice, “whether there is really a
rule of the Law of Nations which admits such [humanitarian]
133
interventions may well be doubted.” The debate about the
existence of a humanitarian exception to the nonintervention
norm formed part of Lemkin’s rhetorical situation.
C.

Lemkin’s Exigence: Bounding Sovereignty

World War II ultimately made plain the need for a new
international legal order. The dominant interwar conception of
absolute sovereignty attracted its share of blame for the war.
Philip Jessup denounced this “archfiction” as “the quicksand
upon which the foundations of traditional international law are
134
built.” Robert Jackson condemned the “anarchic concept” of
131

POWER, supra note 9, at 6-8 & 519 nn.13 & 20 (quoting statements of
Henry Morgenthau, July 10 & Aug. 11, 1915).
132
See, e.g., STOWELL, supra note 123, at v, 51-52. In a passage about British and
French actions in the 1830s concerning Russian mistreatment of Poles, Stowell writes:
Notwithstanding these attempts to find a ground of justification more
satisfactory than humanity, the intervening powers did, withal, concurrently
and sometimes incidentally, refer to considerations of humanity. But they did
it hesitatingly—almost shamefacedly—as though this, the only juridical basis
upon which their action could be defended, was not one which they cared to
present as the real justification of their intervention.
Id. at 110-11 (citation omitted); see also id. at 187 n.88 (discussing actions taken by a
U.S. consul in Peru, “We note here an embarrassment evidently due to the unfortunate
and unfounded belief that intervention upon the ground of humanity is not justifiable
in international law. We find this same erroneous opinion expressed by Secretary
Knox . . . .”).
133
OPPENHEIM, supra note 102, at 194; accord ROXBURGH, OPPENHEIM’S 3d,
supra note 118, at 229 (same). Oppenheim adds, “[I]t may perhaps be said that in time
the Law of Nations will recognise the rule that interventions in the interest of humanity
are admissible” when done collectively. OPPENHEIM, supra note 102, at 194-95.
134
PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 2, 12
(1948); cf. Robert Keohane, Political Authority After Intervention: Gradations in
Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL
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absolute sovereignty: “It would be hard to devise an intellectual
discipline that would do more to encourage international
135
lawlessness and aggression.”
Lemkin too censures the prevailing conception of
sovereignty, highlighting its role in the failure of the interwar
legal order to constrain domestic atrocities. He writes, “[T]he
genocide policy begun by Germany on its own Jewish citizens
in 1933 was considered as an internal problem which the
German state, as a sovereign power, should handle without
136
Lemkin also criticizes as
interference by other states.”
unjustified and “isolationist” the “opinion” that “a state’s
treatment of its own nationals is an internal matter and of no
137
concern to other states.” He argues that international law
imposes a duty on each state not to “‘menace international
peace and order, and to this end it must treat its own
population in a way which will not violate the dictates of
138
humanity and justice or shock the conscience of mankind.’”
Lemkin begins another article by situating genocide
squarely in the sovereignty debate:
The practices of the National Socialist Government in
Germany . . . gave impetus to a reconsideration of certain principles
of international law. The question arose whether sovereignty goes so
far that a government can destroy with impunity its own citizens
and whether such acts of destruction are domestic affairs or matters
of international concern.139

Indeed, according to his unfinished memoir, Lemkin engaged
with the sovereignty debate from the very start of his rhetorical

DILEMMAS 275, 298 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert Keohane eds., 2003) (criticizing the
“Westphalian fetish of total autonomy from external authority”).
135
Robert H. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect: Legal Answer to International
Lawlessness, 35 A.B.A. J. 813, 813 (1949), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL 354, 355 (Guénaël Mettraux ed., 2008).
136
Raphael Lemkin, Genocide—A Modern Crime, 4 FREE WORLD 39, 43 (1945),
available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/freeworld1945.htm [hereinafter
Lemkin, Modern Crime]; cf. Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, Genocide Before the
U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1946, at C22 (objecting that mass murder and mass
sterilization were regarded as an “internal concern” or “internal affair”).
137
Raphael Lemkin, The Legal Case Against Hitler, Part II, NATION, Mar. 10,
1945, at 268 [hereinafter Lemkin, Legal Case II]. Echoing Stowell, Lemkin lists
“instances of states expressing their concern about another state’s treatment of its own
citizens” and treaties concerning such treatment. Id. at 268-69; see also Lemkin,
Introduction, supra note 123, at 65-66 (listing ten “Persecutions as Grounds for
Humanitarian Intervention”).
138
Lemkin, The Legal Case II, supra note 137, at 269 (quoting “a study published
in 1944 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace”).
139
Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 145-46.
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Lemkin opposed an absolutist

I felt that a law against . . . racial or religious murder must be
adopted by the world . . . I discussed the matter with my professors.
They evoked the argument about sovereignty of states. “But
sovereignty of states,” I answered, “implies conducting an
independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools,
construction of roads, in brief, all types of activity directed towards
the welfare of people. Sovereignty,” I argued, “cannot be conceived as
the right to kill millions of innocent people.”141

On the absolutist vision, sovereignty is an end—perhaps even
142
the end, the “Letztbegründung (first principle)” —of
international legal order. This passage from Lemkin’s memoir
suggests he held a radically different vision of sovereignty as
143
means; the end is human welfare.
To make the move from sovereignty as end to
sovereignty as human-serving means, one must accept both
substantive limits on the freedom of states vis-à-vis their
populations and mechanisms of accountability for states that
144
exceed these limits. Barbarity, vandalism, and ultimately
genocide thus acted as Lemkin’s tools in his effort to bound
sovereignty, both substantively and with mechanisms of
accountability. His approach to accountability centers on
criminalization and prosecution. This prosecutorial approach
reflects Lemkin’s own background in criminal law. In 1933,
when he first proposed criminalizing barbarity and vandalism,
Lemkin was working as a prosecutor, an instructor of
comparative criminal law, and the Secretary General of the
140

See supra text accompanying note 98.
Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 371 (emphasis added).
142
See Anne Peters, Humanity as the Α and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 513, 514-15 (2009) (arguing that humanity has ousted sovereignty as the first
principle of international law, such that sovereignty “has a legal value only to the
extent that it respects human rights, interests, and needs”); cf. Evan Criddle & Evan
Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 347 (2009)
(arguing that “a state’s claim to sovereignty, properly understood, relies on its
fulfillment of a multifaceted and overarching fiduciary obligation to respect the agency
and dignity of the people subject to state power”).
143
Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, What Use for Sovereignty Today?, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L
L. 61, 65 (2011) (“The general law for supreme sovereigns is this: Let the people’s
welfare be the supreme law.” (quoting SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS
AND OF NATURE 737 (1672)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reisman, supra note
103, at 40 (“[H]uman rights, most broadly understood, [should be] the major goal and
the major justification of world order.”).
144
Cf. Yale Commentary, supra note 31, at 1150 n.61 (“Establishment of [an
international court to prosecute genocide] would, of course, limit the nebulous concept
of sovereignty.”).
141
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Polish section of the International Association of Penal Law.
In his proposal—sent to the Madrid “Conference for the
Unification of Penal Law”—Lemkin argues that barbarity and
vandalism should be recognized as “offenses against the law of
nations” subject to the “principle of universal repression,” under
which they would be “prosecuted and punished independently of
the place where the act was committed and of the nationality of
146
the author.” Lemkin brings to genocide this focus on criminal
147
148
prosecution —mainly prosecution by other states, but he also
raises the possibility of “trial by an international court” to be
149
Far from the view that
established for that purpose.
sovereignty entails freedom even from external criticism,
Lemkin envisions an international legal order in which states
and the international community could—and should—prosecute
150
officials of other states for (certain) domestic acts.

145

See Vrdoljak, supra note 6, at 1175-77.
Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 2 (proposed art. 7); see also
Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 70 (“‘[U]niversal repression’ . . . makes the soil
burn under the feet of . . . offenders” who try to flee.). The “principle of universal
repression” is better known today as “universal jurisdiction.” See generally THE
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001).
147
See, e.g., LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 93 (“An international
multilateral treaty should provide for the introduction, not only in the constitution but also
in the criminal code of each country, of provisions protecting minority groups . . . . Each
criminal code should have provisions inflicting penalties for genocide practices.”).
148
See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (“[T]he principle of universal repression should be
adopted for the crime of genocide.”); Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 70 (same).
149
See Lemkin, Legal Case II, supra note 137, at 269 (“Allied military courts
should conduct the trials.”); Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 43 (“[O]ffenders
should be subject to trial by an international court.”).
150
Lemkin sometimes comments that genocide legitimizes “humanitarian
intervention”—by which he means diplomatic objections. See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra
note 53, at 146 & n.1, 150 (describing two diplomatic communications as instances of
humanitarian intervention); Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 2 (“diplomatic
actions on behalf of the victims of such violations (humanitarian interventions)”);
Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 71 (“[T]he organs of the United Nations will
have the right to intervene or otherwise to express their concern.”).
Although discussions today about humanitarian intervention equate it with
the use of military force, I have seen nothing in Lemkin’s published writings to suggest
this is how he conceived it. Cf. POWER, supra note 9, at 58 (“[N]either the [Genocide
Convention] nor [its] drafters discussed the use of force. It was a large enough leap to
convince a state’s leaders to denounce or punish the crimes of a fellow state.”). Indeed, the
only publication I have seen in which Lemkin may have addressed military intervention
is the Yale Commentary, supra note 31, at 1148, 1149 n.54, which dismisses the
“theoretical[]” possibility of the Security Council authorizing force to stop genocide as
“negligible,” “difficult to conceive,” and “very unlikely.” On the other hand, in an
unfinished manuscript, Lemkin briefly discusses humanitarian intervention in a way
that suggests he shares Stowell’s view that intervention may take a variety of forms up to
and including military force. See Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 60-66.
146
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War, Peace, Crime, Punishment, and Lemkin’s Exigence

Lemkin first published his new word after the Allies
had begun to debate how to punish Axis leaders after the War.
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had committed in the Moscow
Declaration of 1943 to punish the “Hitlerite forces” responsible
151
for “atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions.”
The Moscow Declaration specified that most perpetrators
would be “judged and punished” in “the countries in which
their abominable deeds were done,” while reserving to the
Allies to “punish by joint decision” the Nazi leaders (i.e., those
“German criminals whose offenses have no particular
152
geographical localization”).
One key issue under debate was whether to punish
atrocities committed by Germans in Germany against German
citizens—notably, but not only, German Jews. As revelations
about Nazi horrors emerged, Allied leaders declared their intent
to punish those responsible, but these pronouncements often
skirted what might be called the jurisdictional question. For
example, in December 1942, soon after receiving Jan Karski’s
report, the Allies “condemn[ed] in the strongest possible terms
[the Nazis’] bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination” of
153
Jews. Yet, this Joint Declaration was actually worded to focus
only on crimes committed in “occupied countries”:
[T]he German authorities, not content with denying to persons of
Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has
been extended, the most elementary human rights, are now carrying
into effect Hitler’s oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish
people in Europe. From all the occupied countries Jews are being
transported in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to
Eastern Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi
slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invader are
being systematically emptied of all Jews . . . .154

151

Moscow Declaration, supra note 59, Statement on Atrocities.
Id.
153
Joint Declaration, Dec. 17, 1942, reprinted in 11 Allies Condemn Nazi War
on Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1942, at 1.
154
Id.; see also Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 178, 184 (1946) (“[T]his statement, in its careful wording, is restricted to crimes
committed . . . in . . . . occupied countries . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Other wartime documents reflect similar jurisdictional tensions. See generally
SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 35-42. Schabas quotes the British Lord Chancellor, who
distinguished between “atrocities committed against the Jews . . . . in occupied
territories,” which “come within the territory of war crimes,” and similar acts
“committed in enemy territory,” which “raise serious difficulties.” Id. at 37-38 (quoting
UNWCC Doc. C.78, Feb. 15, 1945) (emphasis added).
152
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After achieving Victory in Europe, the Allies met in
London to negotiate what came to be known as the Nuremberg
155
Charter. The Charter established an International Military
Tribunal with jurisdiction over three crimes: crimes against
156
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It defined
157
the last, the most relevant here, as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war[,]158 or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.159

In his landmark article on crimes against humanity, Egon
Schwelb observes that the Charter’s definition “has, from the very
160
beginning, caught the imagination of international lawyers.”
Phrases like “before or during the war,” “against any civilian
population,” and “whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated” appeared to herald a new
161
balance between the international and the domestic.
Schwelb shows, however, that the promise of these
phrases gave way to other language confining crimes against
humanity to those acts taken “in execution of or in connection
with any [other] crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,”
162
namely, crimes against peace and war crimes. This language
reflected the Allies’ decision in London to adopt a jurisdictional
approach that “insisted upon a nexus between the war itself
155

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
156
Id. art. 6.
157
Lemkin’s word is not found in the Nuremberg Charter, but his concept
resonates with the Charter’s definition of crimes against humanity to such an extent as to
allow the word itself to appear in the Nuremberg indictment: “They conducted deliberate
and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the
civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and
classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and
Gypsies and others.” Indictment of Hermann Goering, et al., Count 3, § VIII(a), (Oct. 6,
1945) (emphasis added), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count.asp. The
indictment’s mention of genocide pleased Lemkin. See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man,
supra note 7, at 367 (“I went to London and succeeded in having inscribed the charge of
genocide against the Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg.”); see also Barrett, supra note 12,
at 44-46.
158
This comma appeared in the original Russian text, but had been a semicolon in the original English and French texts. See infra note 165.
159
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 155, art. 6(c).
160
Schwelb, supra note 154, at 178.
161
See id. at 178-79.
162
See id. at 203-05, 218.
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and the atrocities committed by the Nazis against their own
163
Jewish populations.” The nexus requirement minimized the
extent of the Charter’s jurisdictional innovation. The Allies
sought not to rewrite the borders between the international and
domestic but rather to extend the international modestly from
established war crimes to similar crimes connected to the war
164
effort—even if they occurred before the war began. The Allies
165
later amended the Charter to bolster the nexus requirement.
In the end, the Nuremberg Tribunal found ample evidence of
166
wartime crimes against humanity, but it concluded that the
163

SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 40. Schabas quotes Robert Jackson in London:

It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our Government from time
immemorial that the internal affairs of another government are not
ordinarily our business, that is to say, the way Germany treats its
inhabitants . . . is not our affair any more than it is the affair of some other
government to interpose itself in our problems. The reason that this program
of extermination of Jews . . . becomes an international concern is this: it was
a part of a plan for making an illegal war. Unless we have a war connection
as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no basis for dealing with
atrocities. . . . We have some regrettable circumstances at times in our own
country in which minorities are unfairly treated.
Id. (quoting Report of Robert H. Jackson 331, 333 (1945)).
164
Schabas criticizes “Jackson’s narrow view,” id. at 41, once calling it
“hypocritical.” See William Schabas, Semantics or Substance? David Scheffer’s Welcome
Proposal to Strengthen Criminal Accountability for Atrocities, 2 GENOCIDE STUDIES &
PREVENTION 31, 33 (2007). By contrast, Bassiouni argues that the Allies’ approach
reflected a “trade-off . . . [intended] to strengthen the validity” of crimes against humanity
by more firmly entwining the new crime with settled law. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 29-30 (2d rev. ed. 1999).
165
See Protocol Rectifying Discrepancy in the Charter, done at Berlin, Oct. 6,
1945, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtprot.asp. The Charter definition of
crimes against humanity had a semi-colon in the English and French texts, but a
comma in Russian. The Allies agreed that “the Russian text is correct” and amended
the punctuation in the other texts accordingly (while also making other changes to the
French wording only). Id. Schwelb describes this change as having “considerable
importance, inter alia, because it entails that the qualification contained in the second
part of the paragraph, and expressed by the words ‘in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal’, refers to the whole text of
Article 6(c).” Schwelb, supra note 154, at 188, 193-95.
Lemkin criticizes the punctuation change as “the rectification of an alleged
error.” Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 148 (emphasis added). Roger Clark likewise
expresses “the nagging doubt . . . that there had been a change of position.” See
BASSIOUNI, supra note 164, at 29 (quoting Roger Clark, Crimes Against Humanity at
Nuremberg, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 190-92 (George
Ginsburgs & Vladimire Kudriavtsev eds., 1990)). Bassiouni argues, however, that the
drafters “always intended” to apply the limiting words in the second part of the
definition to the entire definition to effect the necessary “trade-off” discussed supra
note 164. Id. at 29-30.
166
See “Persecution of the Jews” in Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (1946), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/judcont.asp [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment]
(holding that the Nazis had subjected Jews to “consistent and systematic inhumanity on
the greatest scale”).
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prosecutors largely failed to prove the necessary connections
167
between prewar atrocities and the War.
Lemkin might have been expected to take some comfort
from Nuremberg’s historic convictions of Nazi leaders
responsible for the deaths of millions, including his own
168
parents. In fact, however, the prosecutor Henry King recalls
seeing Lemkin “very upset” a few days after the judgment: “He
was concerned that the decision . . . did not go far enough in
dealing with genocidal actions. This was because the [Tribunal]
limited its judgment to wartime genocide and did not include
169
peacetime genocide.” Lemkin explains, “From the point of
view of international law, . . . acts committed before the war by
Germany on its citizens were more significant. Had the
Tribunal punished such acts a precedent would have been
established to the effect that a Government is precluded from
170
destroying groups of its own citizens.”
In his unpublished memoir, Lemkin adds, “For years, I
tried to establish genocide as [an] international crime both in
time of war and peace, and what I obtained in Nuremberg was

167

The Tribunal explained:

The persecution of Jews [before the war started in 1939] is established
beyond all doubt. . . . The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and
horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved
that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any [crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal]. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a
general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity
within the meaning of the Charter . . . .
Id. at “The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity”; see also
International Law Commission, Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, principle VI
(1950) (limiting its definition of crimes against humanity to acts “done . . . in execution
of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime”). Although the
Tribunal declined to make a “general declaration” linking prewar acts to the war, it did
treat prewar acts in Austria and Sudetenland as crimes against humanity, finding that
Germany had acquired control over those places through illegal acts of aggression. See
Schwelb, supra note 154, at 204-05.
168
See POWER, supra note 9, at 49, 528 n.7 (“In Nuremberg [Lemkin] met up
with his older brother, Elias; Elias’s wife; and their two sons. They told him that they
were the family’s sole survivors. At least 49 others, including his parents, . . . had
perished . . . .”).
169
Henry King, Genocide and Nuremberg, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 29, 29 (Ralph
Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007). But see Barrett, supra note 12, at 52-53
(contending that Lemkin had left Nuremberg before the verdict and that King
misremembered the timing in his essay written sixty years later).
170
Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 148; cf. Lemkin, Legal Case II, supra note
137 (advocating trials “to clarify the standards by which international society can live”).
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171

fragmentary treatment of the problem.” Lemkin considers
Nuremberg’s outcome incomplete, because it penalized
offenders already apprehended without “establish[ing] a rule of
international law that would prevent and punish future crimes
172
of the same type.” Because of the limitations of the wartime
nexus requirement, Lemkin regards the Nuremberg approach
as achieving only “‘an advance of 10 or 20 percent’ toward
173
outlawing genocide.”
Lemkin’s exigence was bounding sovereignty. This
entailed the necessity of establishing genocide as inherently a
matter of international concern, always eligible for what might
be termed “prosecutorial interference.” Lemkin wanted
recognition that Germany’s mistreatment of its own citizens is
174
“[c]learly . . . not Germany’s private concern.” To this end, he
wanted Nuremberg to establish a “precedent . . . to the effect
that a Government is precluded from destroying groups of its
175
own citizens.” He could achieve his goal only if nations
recognized genocide as a crime in peacetime, because nations

171

Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 368; see also id. at 384
(“[T]he purely juridical consequences of the [Nuremberg] trials were wholly
insufficient . . . .”).
172
Id. at 384; cf. Schwelb, supra note 154, at 225-26 (concluding that “[t]he
idea of external judicial interference within the area of exclusive domestic jurisdiction
has certainly made some progress,” but is restricted in various ways such that “[t]he
task of making the protection of human rights general, permanent, and effective still
lies ahead”).
173
Anti-Genocide Gains Termed Significant, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1947, at 8
[hereinafter Anti-Genocide Gains] (quoting Lemkin); cf. Yale Commentary, supra note
31, at 1146 (“the legal impotence of Nuremberg”).
In discussing the limitations of Nuremberg (and Lemkin’s reactions
thereto), I do not wish to unduly criticize it. Progress is often incremental, and the
Nuremberg Charter surely “took a step forward in the form of a jurisdictional extension
when it provided that the victims of the same types of conduct which constitutes war
crimes, were protected without the requirement that they be of a different nationality
than that of the perpetrators,” even with the requirement of a nexus to the war.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 164, at 72. Bassiouni describes well the pressures and hurdles
faced by the Allies, each with different interests and legal systems, as they established
a novel mechanism capable of collectively adjudicating difficult issues in a short time;
such an effort “necessarily requires political and legal compromises that may not be
entirely sound.” Id. at 6-19. Bassiouni nicely conveys this perspective on Nuremberg
with his epigraph from Machiavelli’s The Prince: “There is nothing more difficult to
take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take
the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.” Id. at 1.
174
Lemkin, Legal Case II, supra note 137, at 269.
175
Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 148; accord COOPER, supra note 31, at 72
(quoting a letter Lemkin wrote to Trygve Lie on May 20, 1946, which predicted that
“[a] precedent will be set [at Nuremberg] for the intervention in internal affairs of
other countries on behalf of persecuted minorities”).
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had always accepted international war as a matter of
176
international concern.
Disappointed with the Nuremberg Tribunal, Lemkin
turned to a different forum: the UN General Assembly. He
“returned hastily . . . to New York and arranged, within a couple
of days, that the governments of Cuba, India, and Panama
sponsor [a] resolution [which Lemkin drafted] that genocide is a
crime under international law, without any limitations to war or
177
peace.” When the General Assembly passed a resolution against
178
genocide, without any limitation to wartime, Lemkin exulted in
the triumph of his concept over absolutist sovereignty: “[B]y
making [genocide] a problem of international concern, . . . the
resolution . . . changes fundamentally the . . . responsibilities of a
179
government toward its citizens.” The Genocide Convention, in
turn, expressly declares genocide an international crime regardless
180
“whether committed in time of peace or in time of war.”
Nuremberg thus played a dual role in Lemkin’s
rhetorical project. It clearly marked an historic step toward
international criminal accountability for perpetrators of crimes
against humanity (including, for this purpose, genocide). Yet its
limitations also spurred Lemkin to pursue—and the United
176

The concept of peacetime genocide runs through Lemkin’s writings. See,
e.g., LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiii (advocating a treaty to prohibit
“extermination attempts and oppression in time of peace”); id. at 93 (“genocide is a
problem not only of war but also of peace”); Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at
42; Raphael Lemkin, Genocide, 15 AM. SCHOLAR 227, 230 (1946) [hereinafter Lemkin,
Genocide] (specifying that a treaty must “provid[e] for [genocide’s] prevention and
punishment in time of peace and war”). Although the peacetime theme originates in
Axis Rule, it had not yet become the priority later evidenced by Lemkin’s criticisms of
Nuremberg. This treatise, after all, focuses on Axis rule “in Occupied Europe.” It
concerns German occupation practices, not domestic policies. Even its chapter on
persecution of Jews is, like the Allies’ Joint Declaration, limited to “Jews in the
occupied countries.” See LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 77.
177
Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 368.
178
See G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13. The final resolution exceeds Lemkin’s
draft, which did not definitively declare genocide to be an international crime and a
subject of international concern, but only called for a study and “a report on the
possibilities” of such a declaration. See U.N. Doc. A/BUR/50, reprinted in 1 THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 3 (Hirad Abtahi & Philippa
Webb eds., 2008) [hereinafter THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION].
179
Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 150; see also Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra
note 7, at 70 (“From [the resolution] follows a most important consequence: the
destruction of [listed] groups is no longer an internal affair of the country involved but
a matter of international concern.”); Anti-Genocide Gains, supra note 173, at 8 (quoting
Lemkin as describing the resolution as “a real revolution in international law, in that it
tries to reconcile the interests of all human beings everywhere with the principle of
sovereignty”); Yale Commentary, supra note 31, at 1156 (“In contemplating eventual
international court jurisdiction over individuals in time of peace, the genocide treaty
introduces a completely new international law concept.”).
180
Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. I.
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Nations to make—a clearer assertion that genocide is inherently
181
Lemkin’s
and always a matter of international concern.
reaction to Nuremberg both confirms the central importance of
sovereignty-bounding to his exigence and illustrates one key
aspect of the norm he sought to impose: genocide is a crime
warranting punishment in both war and peace.
E.

Genocide as Boundary

If Lemkin means genocide to bound sovereignty, the
next question is exactly what boundary he intends to draw.
From the start, Lemkin’s conception of genocide concerned
the destruction of groups. Lemkin insists that this focus
distinguishes genocide from “inadequate” preexisting concepts
182
like “denationalization” and “Germanization.” Although some
details shift as Lemkin’s word moves from conception to
Convention, his emphasis always remains on groups.
For Lemkin, “mass killing” is one “technique” of
183
genocide. It is not synonymous with genocide and is neither
184
Rather,
necessary nor sufficient to constitute genocide.
Lemkin describes a variety of other techniques for pursuing
genocide: political, social, cultural, economic, biological,
185
physical, religious, and moral. Mass killing only qualifies as
181

See Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, For Punishment of Genocide,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1947, at L24 (“The Nuremberg judgment decided that crimes
against humanity are punishable only when committed during a war of aggression. For
punishing the destruction of human groups in time of peace another legal machinery
had to be sought.”); Raphael Lemkin, War Against Genocide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
MAG., Jan. 31, 1948, at 2 (“[T]he crimes established in Nuremberg apply only in
relationship between a conqueror and a conquered country. Crimes applicable in time
of peace, in relations among sovereign states, are a completely different matter.”); see
also SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 642 (“If the law of Nuremberg had recognized what
Raphael Lemkin called ‘peacetime genocide’, there would probably have been no
General Assembly resolution and no Convention. Neither would have been necessary.
There would have been no . . . gap to fill.”).
182
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79-80 (criticizing words that failed to
capture the “destruction of the biological structure” of the target group). Lemkin also
faults “Germanization,” “Italianization,” and “Magyarization” for failing to establish
“the common elements of one generic notion . . . .” Id. at 80.
183
Id. at 88-89.
184
See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 147 (“Mass murder or
extermination wouldn’t apply in the case of sterilization.”); Lemkin, Modern Crime,
supra note 136, at 39 (“[T]he term [genocide] does not necessarily signify mass killings
although it may mean that. More often it refers to a coordinated plan aimed at
destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups so that these
groups wither and die like plants that have suffered a blight.”).
185
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 82-90. Lemkin distinguishes between
biological and physical techniques. The former focuses on reducing the birth rate of the
target group (e.g., by separating men and women) and increasing that of the dominant
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genocide when it “aim[s] at the destruction of essential
186
foundations of the life of national groups.” Lemkin thus
conceives of genocide not as murder, but—by analogy to
187
murder—as the destruction of a group.
By treating mass killing as a technique of genocide,
Lemkin shows that his exigence focuses on peoples more than
persons. Lemkin displays this group focus throughout his work.
As early as his Madrid proposal in 1933, Lemkin argues for
criminalizing barbarity on the ground that:
The goal of the [perpetrator] is not only to harm an individual, but,
also to cause damage to the collectivity to which the later belongs.
Offenses of this type bring harm not only to human rights, but also
and most especially they undermine the fundemental [sic] basis of
the social order.188

For Lemkin, then, the harm to groups both distinguishes
barbarity from other offenses and makes it an appropriate
subject of international concern. His concern was “most
especially” with “social order” rather than “human rights.”
Lemkin carries this group focus into his work on
genocide, which “is directed against the national group as an
entity, and the actions involved are directed against
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of

group (e.g., by subsidizing procreation), while the latter involves causing physical harm
to individual members of the target group. Id. at 86-89. Lemkin identifies mass killing
as one of three physical techniques, together with “[r]acial [d]iscrimination in [f]eeding”
and “[e]ndangering of [h]ealth.” Id. at 87-89.
186
Id. at 79.
187
See Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 229 (arguing that criminalizing
genocide implies that “every national, racial and religious group has a natural right of
existence,” as homicide does for individuals). Lemkin displays a tendency to describe
groups in anthropomorphic terms: they have a “life,” a “biological structure,” and a
“natural right of existence.” Id.; see also supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. He
praises a draft of the Convention for treating “[t]he human group . . . as a living entity.”
Lemkin, War Against Genocide, supra note 181. Accordingly, A. Dirk Moses describes
Lemkin’s concept as “groupism, . . . the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations, and
races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed, that is, to
regard them as internally homogenous, external bounded groups, even unitary
collective actors with common purposes.” A. Dirk Moses, Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and
the Concept of Genocide, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENOCIDE STUDIES 19, 22
(Donald Bloxham & A. Dirk Moses eds., 2010) [hereinafter THE OXFORD HANDBOOK]
(quoting Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups, in FACING ETHNIC CONFLICTS:
TOWARDS A NEW REALISM 35 (Andreas Wimmer et al. eds., 2004)) (internal punctuation
omitted). Moses further locates Lemkin in the traditions of “Polish romantic
nationalists,” who “belie[ved] in the unique role of each people in the ‘symphony of
nations’”; Jewish Bundists, who “believed in multiethnic states with minority
protection”; and liberal imperialists, who supported imperialism as long as it served
the goal of civilization, but opposed extreme violence. Id. at 23-28.
188
Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 5.
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189

the national group.” He argues for prohibiting genocide to fill
190
a gap in the Hague Regulations, which “are silent regarding
191
the preservation of the integrity of a people.” He points to
rising “interest in national groups as distinguished from states
and individuals” in the recent “evolution of international law”
and thus situates his word with the interwar concern for
192
protecting minority groups.
In the opening passage of Axis Rule’s chapter on
genocide, Lemkin identifies four possible groups capable of
being victimized by genocide: nations, ethnic groups, races, and
193
194
tribes. He later adds religions and tends to omit tribes. He
sees these groups as special, writing in an unpublished
manuscript that they are “based on the formula of the human
cosmos. This cosmos consists of four basic groups: national,
195
racial, religious and ethnic.”
The common thread among Lemkin’s groups is culture.
He seeks to protect those groups he sees as creators and
196
preservers of culture, “the spiritual resources of mankind.” He
evidences his concern for culture as early as his 1933 proposal to
outlaw vandalism, the “destruction of the culture and works of
197
art.” Cultural concerns persist in Lemkin’s work on genocide.
Axis Rule states: “[N]ations are essential elements of the world
community. The world represents only so much culture and
intellectual vigor as are created by its component national

189

LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79.
Lemkin refers to the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, annexed to Hague Convention (IV) of 1907. See id. at 14 n.17.
191
Id. at 90.
192
See id. at 90-91 (referencing the Treaty of Versailles, “specific minority
treaties,” and constitutions and penal codes promulgated after 1918); Lemkin, Modern
Crime, supra note 136, at 43 (associating his project with “[t]he principle of the
international protection of minorities . . . proclaimed by post-Versailles minority
treaties,” while criticizing those treaties as “inadequate” in several respects); see also
supra notes 114, 147.
193
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79.
194
See, e.g., Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 228 (“national, racial or
religious groups”).
195
Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 1; cf. Lemkin, War Against
Genocide, supra note 181 (“In its essential ideological and biological foundations, the
history of mankind is centered more around the human group (genos) than around the
state . . . .”).
196
Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 1.
197
Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 7. Lemkin elaborates: “An
attack targeting a collectivity can also take the form of systematic and organized
destruction of the art and cultural heritage in which the unique genius and
achievement of a collectivity are revealed . . . .” Id.
190
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groups. . . . The destruction of a nation, therefore, results in the
198
loss of its future contributions to the world . . . .”
Lemkin later elaborates, by force of example:
Cultural considerations speak for international protection of national,
religious and cultural groups. Our whole heritage is a product of the
contributions of all nations. We can best understand this when we
realize how impoverished our culture would be if the peoples doomed
by Germany, such as the Jews, had not been permitted to create the
Bible, or to give birth to an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the Poles had not
had the opportunity to give to the world a Copernicus, a Chopin, a
Curie; the Czechs, a Huss, a Dvorak; the Greeks, a Plato and a
Socrates; the Russians, a Tolstoy and a Shostakovich.199

Lemkin captures the heart of his idea with the words
200
“[g]enocide is essentially an ethnico-cultural concept.”
This “ethnico-cultural” conception of genocide explains
various aspects of Lemkin’s approach. It explains why he
believes mass killings do not constitute genocide absent
201
targeting a protected group. It explains why he omits political,
202
social, and other groups from his list of protected groups. It
explains the breadth of techniques—especially cultural
techniques, like destroying museums and libraries or restricting
203
artists and musicians—he deems capable of effecting genocide.
198

LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 91.
Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 228.
200
Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, For Punishment of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1947, at L24. Lemkin used the same phrase in a letter to Sir Hartley
Shawcross on July 8, 1947. See COOPER, supra note 31, at 94-95. Similarly, in a letter
to Eleanor Roosevelt in 1946, Lemkin described genocide as “a term I coined for the
concept of killing nations and obliterating their cultures.” Id. at 51 (quoting Lemkin).
201
See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 147 (“[M]ass murder does not
convey the specific losses to civilization in the form of the cultural contributions which
can be made only by groups of people united through national, racial or cultural
characteristics.”).
202
In this regard, Lemkin often discusses Jews, Roma, and Slavs as victims of
Nazi genocide. See, e.g., Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227; Lemkin, War
Against Genocide, supra note 181. By contrast, I see no mention in his 1944-1948
writings of such other victim groups as the disabled and homosexuals. These groups
generally received little attention in the early years after the war. See, e.g., Nuremberg
Indictment, supra note 157, Count 3 (charging genocide against “Jews, Poles, and
Gypsies and others”); Dorthe Seifert, Between Silence and License: The Representation
of the National Socialist Persecution of Homosexuality in Anglo-American Fiction and
Film, 15 HIST. & MEMORY 94, 94 (2003) (“Public knowledge and awareness of the
persecution of homosexuality in National Socialist Germany remained limited until
1979 . . . .”). Even with knowledge, however, Lemkin might well have considered these
groups beyond his “ethnico-cultural concept[ion]” of genocide. Cf. SCHABAS, supra note
15, at 153-71 (arguing that violence targeting these groups, among others, should be
regarded as crimes against humanity but not genocide).
203
See, e.g., LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 84-85; Lemkin, War Against
Genocide, supra note 181 (arguing that it is “especially important” to protect “houses of
worship, objects of religious cult, schools, treasures of art and culture” because
199
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Other Exigences

Advocates often must persuade the audience that there
is a problem in need of a solution. This is “often . . . the most
fundamental exigence faced by advocates,” because “[i]nertia is
204
a powerful force in human affairs.”
Lemkin failed at this task in Madrid in 1933. He could
not persuade his audience that barbarity and vandalism
presented sufficient risks to warrant adding them to the short
205
list of international crimes. For genocide to succeed where its
predecessors had failed, Lemkin had to show the audience that
206
genocide was a real and recurring phenomenon. Even the
horrors of the Holocaust might not have sufficed to criminalize
genocide if the international community had perceived Nazi
atrocities as a unique, isolated instance unlikely to be
207
repeated. In presenting his word, therefore, Lemkin takes care
both to associate it with the compelling, contemporaneous case
of the Nazis and to establish a pattern of genocide dating back to
antiquity. Axis Rule describes genocide as a “new word . . . to
208
denote an old practice in its modern development.” In another
article, Lemkin quotes Hitler’s statement that “[i]n former days
it was the victor’s prerogative to destroy tribes, entire peoples”
209
and then responds, strikingly, “Hitler was right.”

“[r]eligion can be destroyed within a group even if the members of the group continue
to subsist physically”).
204
See supra notes 89-93.
205
See POWER, supra note 9, at 21-23 (quoting one delegate who thought
barbarity happened “too seldom to legislate”).
206
Cf. Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 68 (“Only experiences, and in
this particular field we are sorry to say, only great disasters, can convince nations to
give up more of their sovereignty in order to achieve bigger international goals.”).
207
See, e.g., Lemkin, War Against Genocide, supra note 181 (“The Soviet
delegate argued ‘genocide was committed only by the Nazis; since Germany is
destroyed, there is no more danger of genocide.’”).
208
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79. To illustrate his claim that genocide
dates to antiquity, Lemkin lists “[t]he most widely known cases of genocide” before Hitler:
the destruction of Carthage, the destruction of the Albigenses and Waldenses,
the Crusades, the march of the Teutonic Knights, the destruction of the
Christians under the Ottoman Empire, the massacres of the Herreros in
Africa, the extermination of the Armenians, the slaughter of the Christian
Assyrians in 1933, the destruction of the Maronites, and the pogroms against
the Jews in Czarist Russia and Rumania.
Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7.
209
Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 39. Lemkin and Hitler part
ways (of course) about whether past events constitute precedents to be followed or
crimes to be condemned.
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Lemkin’s challenge, then, was to establish among the
countless incidences of humanity’s inhumanity a recurring
subset deserving of criminalization. The preexisting words
barbarity and vandalism had failed to reveal a sufficient
pattern. Lemkin coined his word to help the international
210
community see old crimes in new ways.
Likewise, advocates often must persuade the audience to
care about the problem. It is not enough to establish the
existence of a problem, even a recurring problem. The problem
must be important—worthy of a claim on the audience’s
211
attention, empathy, energy, resources, and time. And the
advocate must meet this burden not in a vacuum, but in a world
filled with other problems making competing claims on the
audience. In short, the advocate must overcome indifference.
Neville Chamberlain exemplifies indifference in his
infamous description of Hitler’s threat to Czechoslovakia as “a
quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we
212
know nothing.” Elie Wiesel describes eloquently the “perils of
indifference”:
Indifference . . . is more dangerous than anger and hatred. Anger can
at times be creative. One writes a great poem, a great symphony,
[does] something special for the sake of humanity because one is
angry at the injustice that one witnesses. But indifference is never
creative. . . . Indifference is not a response.

210

In this regard, Jasinski discusses the scholarly literature on the ways
language and “social knowledge” help to “make the world visible.” See JASINSKI, supra
note 67, at 185, 525. Naming a phenomenon can help humans to recognize and
understand it. See id. at 120. It is social knowledge, for example, that helps a viewer to
see a series of physical movements by individuals as a play conducted by a football
team. See id. at 120, 525. Of course, depending on the name and definition selected,
they may serve to mystify rather than clarify. See id. at 120, 185, 378.
211
Cf. Bitzer, Functional Communication, supra note 74, at 32 (“An exigence
will generate more interest if its likely consequences are numerous and of great
significance . . . .”).
212
See Neville Chamberlain, WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Neville_
Chamberlain (quoting Prime Minister on the Issues, TIMES (London), Sept. 28, 1938, at
10). Chamberlain’s quotation centers on the problem of indifference across national
borders, but humanity must also struggle against borders of “race, color, or creed”:
When Claude Lanzmann was filming Shoah, he asked a Polish peasant
whose fields abutted a death camp what he felt when he saw human ash from
the crematoria chimneys raining down on his fields. The peasant replied:
“When I cut my finger, I feel it. When you cut your finger, you feel it.”
Michael Ignatieff, Lemkin’s Word: The Danger of a World Without Enemies, NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at 25.
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Indifference is not a beginning, it is an end. And, therefore,
indifference . . . benefits the aggressor—never his victim, whose pain
is magnified when he or she feels forgotten.213

Wiesel concludes that indifference denies the victims’
214
humanity and thus “betray[s] our own.” His speech recalls
John Donne’s famous lines: “No man is an island, entire of
itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the
main. . . . Any man’s death diminishes me because I am
involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for
215
whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”
Lemkin sought a word able to toll a bell for mankind. He
216
wanted “THE WORD” to convey “MORAL JUDGEMENT.” He
wanted genocide “to chill listeners and invite immediate
217
condemnation.” Indeed, the heart of Lemkin’s project was to
218
establish genocide as “a matter of international concern.”
Where “[i]ndifference . . . is an end,” concern is a start.
Lemkin offers many reasons to care about genocide.
Prominent among them are the cultural losses genocide inflicts
219
More broadly, Lemkin argues that
on all humanity.
220
genocide’s targeting of groups jeopardizes “social order” and
“the very moral and legal foundations of constitutional
221
government” everywhere.
213

Elie Wiesel, The Perils of Indifference: Lessons Learned from a Violent
Century, Remarks at the White House (Apr. 12, 1999) (transcript available at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/First_Lady/html/generalspeeches/1999/19990412.html).
214
Id.
215
Bassiouni aptly quotes these lines as the epigraph to the first edition of his
book. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, at X (1992).
216
POWER, supra note 9, at 42 (quoting Lemkin’s handwritten notes).
217
Id.
218
G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13 (emphasis added).
219
See supra Part III.E; cf. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (Prosecutor v. Krstic),
Case No. ICTY-98-33-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 36 (Apr. 19, 2004) (Genocide “deprive[s]
humanity of the manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions
provide. This is a crime against all of humankind, its harm being felt not only by the
group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity.”).
220
See supra text accompanying note 188.
221
Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 42-43 (allowing genocide in one
country threatens “the very moral and legal foundations of constitutional government”
everywhere, because all states have “[m]inorities of one sort or another” who depend on
“the constitutional order of the state” for protection). Lemkin adds several other reasons
for concern about genocide, including: tolerating internal aggression invites external
aggression, id.; internal disturbances, especially “[a]rbitrary and wholesale confiscations”
of property, disrupt the conditions needed for international trade, id.; and oppression of
minority groups “result[s] in international disturbances, especially in the form of
disorganized emigration of the persecuted,” LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 93.
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IV.

COMPLETING LEMKIN’S SITUATION

A.

Lemkin’s Audience

589

In the summer of 1942, the U.S. Board of Economic
222
Warfare retained Lemkin as a consultant. His unfinished
autobiography reports: “In my agency, I found complete
unawareness that the Axis planned destruction of the people
under their control. My first attempts to educate my office were
discouraging. The problem I tried to bring up appeared too
223
theoretical and even fantastic to them.” Lemkin felt similarly
frustrated when President Roosevelt rejected his proposal for
the urgent negotiation of a treaty to “make genocide a crime—
224
the crime of crimes”—and counseled “patience” instead. The
need to educate, to make the full import of Nazi actions less
225
fantastic and more urgent, underpins Axis Rule. In particular,
Lemkin sought to educate “the Anglo-Saxon reader, who, with
his innate respect for human rights and human personality, may
be inclined to believe that the Axis régime could not possibly be
226
as cruel and ruthless as it has been hitherto described.”
Axis Rule, as noted already, consists largely of a countryby-country litany of German actions in nineteen occupied
227
territories, supported by English translations of key laws. This
228
is preceded by a shorter “synthesis,” which ends with a chapter
229
titled “Genocide.” This structure evidences Lemkin’s intent to
encapsulate in a single, understandable word the essence of all
230
the Nazi actions catalogued through the rest of the book. It is
222

See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 382.
Id. at 382-83.
224
Id. at 383.
225
Cf. Samantha Power, Introduction to LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at iii,
iv (“With Axis Rule, Lemkin set out to make the unbelievable believable.”). I do not
suggest that Lemkin was moved to write Axis Rule by his experiences in Washington, as
he had started writing it in Sweden in 1940. See LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiv.
But those experiences in Washington must have shaped the way Lemkin finished the
book, and the memoir passage reflects a determination to educate people about the true
nature of Nazi rule, which must have driven Lemkin throughout his work on Axis Rule.
Indeed, Power points to a different passage in the memoir to suggest that Axis Rule may
have been motivated by Lemkin’s frustration that so many Jews stayed in occupied
Poland, because they could not see that Nazi rule would be so much worse than the
pogroms they had endured until then. See Power, Introduction, supra, at iii, iv.
226
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at ix.
227
See supra Part I.B.
228
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at ix.
229
Id. at 79.
230
Cf. Henry Bernhardt, Book Review, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 521, 523 (1945) (“The
author’s presentation culminates in his discussion of ‘genocide,’” where “he succeeds in
showing the Germans at their worst.”); Ignatieff, supra note 212, at 26 (“Lemkin was
223
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the forest, the rest trees. It reveals the pattern, which informs
231
all the details but might be lost among them. A generic word
like “denationalization” or a case-specific word like
“Germanization” would not do, because neither could make
visible to the audience the true nature of the Nazi regime.
Lemkin says in his unfinished autobiography that he
wrote Axis Rule to “appeal directly to the American people”
232
This seems
rather than “rely[ing] on statesmen alone.”
implausible. Axis Rule is 674 pages long, dense, and difficult.233
A book review in the New York Times does a better job than
Lemkin himself of capturing his audience:
[Axis Rule] is . . . a technical legal treatise and a source and
reference work . . . . It will prove an indispensable handbook for
scholars and historians and for those authorities of the [Allies]
charged with undoing, as far as possible, the effects of Axis
domination. But in a sense it is a pity that its nature precludes a
larger audience for this book. For out of its dry legalism there
emerge the contours of the monster that now bestrides the earth.234

This review thus identifies a limited audience that includes,
importantly, Allied governments. Other reviews likewise note
the book’s value to readers responsible for “the making of plans

the first scholar to work out the logic of [Nazi] jurisprudence . . . . [T]he wholesale
extermination of groups was not an accidental or incidental cruelty . . . . It was the very
essence of the occupation . . . .”).
231
The preface seems to confirm this reading of genocide’s significance in the
book’s structure. There, Lemkin introduces each chapter of Part I in order, but inserts
the following before Chapter IX:
The picture of coordinated German techniques of occupation must lead to the
conclusion that the German occupant has embarked upon a gigantic scheme
to change, in favor of Germany, the balance of biological forces between it and
the captive nations for many years to come. The objective of this scheme is to
destroy or to cripple the subjugated peoples . . . . The practice of
extermination of nations and ethnic groups as carried out by the invaders is
called by the author ‘genocide’ . . . .
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xi. This passage suggests that the first eight
chapters depict a “gigantic scheme” to destroy subjugated peoples, while Chapter IX
names that scheme.
232
See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 383.
233
Luban describes it as “an obscure, largely unread, and nearly unreadable
law book.” See Luban, supra note 26, at 307.
234
Otto D. Tolischus, Twentieth-Century Moloch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1945, at
1; accord Thornton Terhune, Book Review, 20 TUL. L. REV. 153, 153 (1945) (“This book,
albeit an excellent one, is definitely not for the casual reader . . . .”). But see Ramsay
Moran, Book Review, 31 VA. L. REV. 730, 733 (1945) (“[T]his work is not intended for
use by legal scholars alone; it is not technical in its language or in the few personal
conclusions of its author. It is, rather, a sober presentation of facts which should
become more widely known to the American people . . . .”).
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235

for restoration and reparation.” In other words, the audience
includes the very people with whom Lemkin worked and
interacted in the U.S. government. Indeed, Axis Rule was
published in Washington, D.C., by the Carnegie Endowment
236
for International Peace, an influential think tank.
As Lemkin strove to embed genocide into the law as a
limit on sovereignty, government officials remained at the core
of his audience. In late 1944, “an advance copy of” Axis Rule
circulated “[i]nside the War Department,” where Lemkin’s
“description of Nazism as organised criminality became a basis
for the plan . . . to try Nazi leaders and their organizations
237
before an international tribunal for the crime of conspiracy.”
Two days after Justice Jackson’s appointment as chief U.S.
negotiator for what became the Nuremberg Charter, Lemkin
238
wrote to call his attention to Axis Rule. Lemkin went on to
work for Jackson’s team. He met with prosecutors, drafters,
negotiators, and decision-makers in Geneva, London, New
239
York, Nuremberg, Paris, and Washington. And he worked the
240
halls of the United Nations.
Lemkin also appealed to constituencies likely to
influence his ultimate audience, such as foreign-policy elites,
international lawyers, and liberal intellectuals. His writings at
this time appeared in publications read by such an audience,
including the American Journal of International Law,
241
242
American Scholar, Christian Science Monitor, Free World,
235

Arthur Kuhn, Book Review, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 360, 361 (1945) (“sourcematerial of inestimable value in the making of plans for restoration and reparation, as
well as for the practitioner and the historian”); accord Merle Fainsod, Book Review, 58
HARV. L. REV. 744, 744 (1945) (“source material for [a history of the Axis occupation]”);
id. at 746 (“those charged with the responsibility of disentangling the spider web of
Axis legislation”); Moran, supra note 234, at 733 (“a great amount of material from
which indictments . . . can be drafted”).
236
The director of the Carnegie Endowment’s international law division
describes Axis Rule in terms that reveal an audience of policy-makers: “a contribution
toward the restoration of peace based upon justice,” which “gives in readily accessible
form in the English language the basic documents and essential factual information
from authentic sources that will be urgently needed when the process starts of
untangling the spider web of Axis legislation.” George Finch, Foreword, in LEMKIN,
AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at vii, viii.
237
See Barrett, supra note 12, at 38.
238
Id. at 36-37.
239
See POWER, supra note 9, at 27, 49-60.
240
See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at A31.
241
An editor’s “inside” account of the Monitor, dated 1958, describes it in
terms that suggest its appeal to Lemkin. It had a large circulation among
governmental elites in the United States and “120 lands”; the U.S. Government often
distributed excerpts to foreign news services; it was “read carefully on Capitol Hill,”
where “legislators introduce[d] material from the Monitor with great frequency in the
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and the United Nations Bulletin. Lemkin likewise cultivated the
media. Journalists recount stories of Lemkin’s constant efforts:
“he would run after [journalists], tie flopping in the air, genocide
243
story at the ready.” Weeks after Axis Rule was published,
Lemkin persuaded the publisher of the Washington Post to run
244
the world’s first editorial about genocide. He published letters
245
to the editor in the New York Times. And he made certain to
246
credit the media for their leadership on the issue.
B.

Lemkin’s Constraints

Like many advocates of major policy changes, Lemkin
had to navigate countless constraints. Many of his constraints
are obvious: the war, its aftermath, and the start of the Cold
War; a fledgling United Nations, not yet even located at its
permanent headquarters; favorable but unspecific language on
247
human rights in the UN Charter, proclaimed in apparent
Congressional Record, usually with a pleasant compliment”; it was “widely subscribed
to by libraries, universities, institutions, public officials, offices, organizations,
professional men” and “read by more newspapermen than any other”; and it “may well
[have been] the most widely quoted newspaper in the world.” See ERWIN D. CANHAM,
COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, at xiiixxiii, 396-403 (1958).
242
Free World magazine was published monthly in New York from late 1941 to
1946 by a group of “well-known intellectuals and political figures” with a “liberal and
international outlook.” Helmut Pfanner, The Contributions by German and Austrian Exiles
in Free World Magazine, TRANS INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN,
http://www.inst.at/trans/15Nr/05_02/pfanner15.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). A
“preponderance” of its essays concerned the war and “the general threat of totalitarianism to
free humanity.” Famous names on its “honorary board” included Albert Einstein, Fiorello
LaGuardia, Thomas Mann, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Id. Free World published works by such
familiar figures as Charles de Gaulle, Ernest Hemingway, Eleanor Roosevelt, Bertrand
Russell, Carl Sandburg, Henry Wallace, and Orson Welles, as well as many European
émigrés. Id.
243
POWER, supra note 9, at 51 (quoting Kathleen Teltsch of the New York
Times); see also id. at 52 (quoting A.M. Rosenthal, “I don’t remember how I met
[Lemkin], but I remember I was always meeting him.”).
244
See id. at 44 (discussing Genocide, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1944).
245
See Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, Genocide Before the U.N., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1946, at C22; Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, For Punishment of
Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1947, at L24.
246
See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 149 n.10 (“An important factor in
the comparatively quick reception of the concept of genocide in international law was
the understanding and support of this idea by the press of the United States and other
countries,” listing “[e]specially remarkable contributions” by eight newspapers in four
countries); Elder, supra note 34, at 485 (quoting Lemkin crediting “the UN
correspondents who ‘did the most remarkable job in explaining the complicated issue to
the world’”).
247
See U.N. Charter pmbl. (“human rights, . . . dignity and worth of the
human person,” “tolerance,” “economic and social advancement of all peoples”); id. art.
1, para. 1 (“principles of justice and international law”); id. art. 1, para. 2 (“equal rights
and self-determination of people”); id. art. 1, para. 3 (“human rights
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tension with language on nonintervention,
neither yet
249
elaborated with experience; “realist” doubts about the utility
of a treaty outlawing genocide; and Lemkin’s lack of funding
250
and institutional support.
The most fundamental constraint upon Lemkin flows
from the very nature of international law. States are the
dominant actors in making and changing international law.
State consent is sometimes regarded as the sine qua non of
international legal obligation; in the words of the Lotus Court,
“The rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their
251
own free will . . . .” Even if the Lotus formulation is overstated,
it remains clear that state consent plays a vital role in the
creation of international legal obligation—most obviously in the
252
case of treaties, but also custom and general practices. Lemkin
could not hope to succeed in bounding sovereignty with genocide
except with the support of many states. Yet, states are
inherently self-interested in conceptions of sovereignty broad
enough to shield themselves from unwanted outside
253
254
interference. This tension permeated Lemkin’s situation.
Last, the basic need to convey his “[n]ew conception[]” to
other humans also acted as a constraint on Lemkin. He
255
concluded that he needed a “new term[].” In this, Lemkin was
and . . . fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion”); id. art. 55 (“universal respect for, and observance of,” same); id. art. 56
(pledging “joint and separate action” to achieve “the purposes set forth in Article 55”).
Articles 13(1)(b), 62(2), and 68 empower the General Assembly and Economic and
Social Council to make commissions, studies, and recommendations to promote human
rights. For an example of Lemkin appealing to the Charter’s principles, see Lemkin,
Genocide, supra note 176, at 228.
248
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . ; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”).
249
See generally Buergenthal, supra note 114, at 785-91 (explaining how the
“intentionally vague Charter provisions on human rights” gained significance through
UN practice, including the “gradual[] reject[ion] by a majority of the UN membership”
of objections based on Article 2(7)).
250
See POWER, supra note 9, at 52-60, 77-78.
251
The Lotus, supra note 104, at 18.
252
See generally Jutta Brunée, Consent, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCL. PUB. INT’L
L., supra note 120.
253
Cf. Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 61 (“[T]he enforcement of
international law is entrusted . . . to the very government most interested in the
pursuit of national policies.”).
254
See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 212 (“It was clear that the issue [of
cultural genocide] had hit a nerve with several countries who were conscious of
problems with their own policies towards minority groups . . . .”); cf. SCHABAS, supra
note 15 (discussing similar concerns at the London Conference).
255
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79; see also Lemkin, Introduction,
supra note 123, at 24-25 (“New words are always created when a social phenomenon
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governed by semantics, defined by Michel Bréal as “the laws
that preside over the transformation of meaning, the choice of
256
new expressions, the birth and death of locutions.” Language
257
is a social institution. Accordingly, would-be neologists are
constrained by the need to ensure their innovations are
intelligible to the audience. Brigitte Nerlich explains,
[T]he individual will is free, we can choose and innovate, but we are
not pre-eminent, we cannot act autocratically over language. Our
freedom has certain limits. The constraints on the democratic
process of word-making are . . . the already existing material and
usages of speech and most importantly the already existing
analogies, the preferred models of language-making.258

Lemkin seems to acknowledge this constraint, conceding that
the “individual creator” only succeeds at propagating a new
259
word “if, and in so far as, it meets popular needs and tastes.”
We have already seen that Lemkin faced the burdens of
establishing that he had identified a real, recurring, and

strikes at our conscience with great force . . . . [L]ike poetry they are essentially the
reply of man to a social need.”). Thomas Jefferson expressed the same idea, albeit in a
more optimistic context:
Had the preposterous idea of fixing the language been adopted by our Saxon
ancestors . . . , the progress of ideas must have stopped with that of the
language . . . . [A]s we advance in the knowledge of new things, and of new
combinations of old ones, we must have new words to express them.
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 194 (quoting 14 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (AE
Bergh ed., 1905) (letter to Joseph Milligan, Apr. 1816)); cf. HENRY HITCHINGS, THE
SECRET LIFE OF WORDS: HOW ENGLISH BECAME ENGLISH 5 (2008) (“A new word is a
solution to a problem.”).
This utilitarian conception of neologism existed at least as long ago as
ancient Rome. Michel Bréal, who himself coined the word “semantics,” quotes the
Roman poet Lucretius: “Utilitas expressit nomina rerum”—i.e., “The pressing need has
created the name of things.” See BRIGITTE NERLICH, CHANGE IN LANGUAGE: WHITNEY,
BRÉAL, AND WEGENER 90, 118-19 (1990). Yet, necessity is neither necessary nor
sufficient to ensure that neologisms will prosper. Compare MICHEL BRÉAL, THE
BEGINNINGS OF SEMANTICS: ESSAYS, LECTURES AND REVIEWS 158 (George Wolf ed. &
trans., 1991) (“[L]anguage is not addressed solely to reason: it seeks to move, to
persuade, to please. Thus we find new images arising for very old things . . . .”), with
STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN
NATURE 304-05 (2007) (“Many gaps in the language simply refuse to be filled,” such as
“[a] collective term for one’s nieces and nephews.”).
256
NERLICH, supra note 255, at 118-19 (quoting Bréal).
257
Id. at 101-02 (discussing the views of William Whitney).
258
Id. at 102 (discussing the views of Whitney); see also id. at 131 (discussing
the views of Bréal, “But language as a system of signs [i.e., words] and a system of
analogies allows the creation of new signs by the analogical application of old material
to new uses according to traditional models. In this way creativity is not entirely free,
not an irrational outburst, but a systematic exploitation of the possibilities provided by
language.”).
259
Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 32.
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important problem worthy of states’ attention and concern. To
these can be added the further challenges of making his
proposed solution both intelligible to the public and palatable
to the very states whose dominion it would curtail.
C.

Lemkin’s Resources

Just as situations confront advocates with challenges,
they also often offer “material that can work to the advocate’s
260
advantage.” These resources display the same variety as
rhetorical constraints except that they favor the advocate’s
position. The relationship between constraints and resources
may be illustrated briefly: in a legal dispute that turns on the
meaning of a statute, if a traditional interpretive maxim favors
the plaintiff but the legislative history favors the defendant,
what is a constraint for one party is an equal and opposite
resource for the other.
As Lemkin navigated constraints in pursuit of his
objective, the situation also presented him with resources.
1. Etymology
Like other neologists, Lemkin had a variety of strategies
available to assure the intelligibility of his word. He chose
261
etymology.
Immediately upon introducing his word, Lemkin
highlights its etymology: “This new word . . . is made from the
ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide
262
263
(killing) . . . .” Lemkin frequently repeats this etymology,
264
successfully persuading others of its significance.

260

JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 516.
Lemkin also relies on analogy, another common technique of word
formation. See text accompanying supra note 258. He notes that his word
“correspond[s] in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homocide [sic], infanticide,
etc.” LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79; see also id. at xi (“by way of analogy, see
homocide [sic], fratricide”).
262
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79. In this, Lemkin’s coinage follows (quite
literally) Henry Morgenthau Sr.’s phrase “race murder.” See POWER, supra note 9, at 6.
263
See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 147; Lemkin, Genocide, supra
note 176, at 228. But see Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7 (omitting etymology).
264
For one of the many endorsements of genocide featuring its etymology, see
Editorial, Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1946. Lemkin can even be seen on YouTube,
where a television interviewer introduces him by relaying the etymology of his word.
Quincy Howe, The Genocide Word by Raphael Lemkin, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFPch5OILfU.
261
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Lemkin’s appeal to the classics is common in word
265
formation, especially among scientists and others seeking to
266
imbue their coinages with prestige. This practice has its
critics, notably George Orwell: “Bad writers, and especially
scientific, political, and sociological writers, are nearly always
haunted by the notion that Latin or Greek words are grander
than Saxon ones . . . . The result, in general, is an increase in
267
slovenliness and vagueness.”
Linguists offer a different critique. They reject the value
of etymology to word meanings, notwithstanding its popular
appeal, because “[u]nstoppable change is the great given in
268
linguistics . . . .” Nevertheless, precisely because of its public
appeal, neologists may invoke etymology to render their
coinages intelligible to the audience. Likewise, where word
meanings are contested, etymology may be a useful resource for
269
advocates on one side.

265

The practice of deriving English words from Greek has been so common for
so long that the number of such words is “greater than the total number of ancient
Greek words known actually to have existed . . . .” HITCHINGS, supra note 255, at 182.
266
Id. at 183. The two main “motivations for borrowing” words from another
language are “need” and “prestige,” with prestige often driving “Graeco-Latin
borrowings.” As a result, such words tend to convey an “educated/technological
register,” which strikes many English speakers as “high-falutin.” See HANS HENRICH
HOCK, PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS 408-09, 425 (2d ed. 1991).
267
George Orwell, Politics and the English Language (1946), reprinted in GEORGE
ORWELL, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 156, 161 (1981); accord WILLIAM STRUNK JR. & E.B.
WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 77 (4th ed. 2000) (“Anglo-Saxon is a livelier tongue than
Latin, so use Anglo-Saxon words.”); THE ECONOMIST STYLE GUIDE 62-63 (1996) (“Short
words. Use them. They are often Anglo-Saxon rather than Latin in origin.”).
268
PINKER, supra note 255, at 149; see also D. CONNOR FERRIS, UNDERSTANDING
SEMANTICS 10 (1983) (“[V]irtually all specialists in semantics agree that we do not need
etymology in order to understand particular meanings, or meaning in general . . . . [T]he
meaning associated with a form can change, and change very dramatically, through
time.”); F.R. PALMER, SEMANTICS 11 (2d ed. 1981) (“Etymology for its own sake is of little
importance, even if it has curiosity value, and there really should be no place for a
smattering of it in dictionaries.”); NERLICH, supra note 255, at 76, 81, 88, 131-33
(discussing the views of Bréal, Whitney, and Ferdinand de Saussure).
269
See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 153-54. For invocations of Lemkin’s
etymology in legal and political discourse, see, for example, Application of Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 193 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosn. & Herz.] (arguing that
the etymology supports construing the Convention to require that a group of victims
“must have particular positive characteristics . . . and not the lack of them”); SCHABAS,
supra note 15, at 157 (describing Belgian argument that the etymology supported
excluding political groups from the Convention’s protected groups).
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2. Associations with the Holocaust
270

As awareness about the Holocaust spread during the
war, public revulsion proved a powerful resource for Lemkin. He
deployed this resource in several recurring strands of his rhetoric.
271

a. Churchill’s Atlantic Charter Address
Churchill met Roosevelt in August 1941, when the
President of the still-neutral United States took a significant
step toward allying with England by agreeing to the Atlantic
Charter’s “common principles” for the “better future” they
hoped would follow “after the final destruction of the Nazi
272
On August 24, upon his return to England,
tyranny.”
Churchill gave a radio address about the Atlantic Charter. In
this broadcast, Churchill recites German conquest of a long list
of countries then turns to the German invasion of Russia:
The Russian armies and all the peoples of the Russian Republic have
rallied to the defence of their hearths and homes . . . . For the first
time in [Hitler’s] experience mass murder has become unprofitable. He
retaliates by the most frightful cruelties. As his armies advance, whole
districts are being exterminated. Scores of thousands . . . of executions
in cold blood are being perpetrated by the German police-troops upon
the Russian patriots who defend their native soil. Since the Mongol
invasions of Europe in the sixteenth century, there has never been
methodical, merciless butchery on such a scale. And this is but the
beginning. Famine and pestilence have yet to follow in the bloody ruts
of Hitler’s tanks. We are in the presence of a crime without a name.273

Lemkin seizes on Churchill’s speech. Titling the
introduction to an article “A crime without a name,” Lemkin

270

Not yet known by that name, which did not come into use until the 1950s.
See COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 315 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter OED]
(attributing the specific application of The Holocaust to “historians during the 1950s,”
while recognizing that this usage “had been foreshadowed by contemporary references
[during the 1940s] to the Nazi atrocities as a ‘holocaust’” in the sense of “a great
slaughter or massacre”).
271
See generally MARTIN GILBERT, AUSCHWITZ AND THE ALLIES (1981)
(describing the course of revelations about Nazi atrocities); see also Edward Ward,
Buchenwald Concentration Camp (BBC Radio Broadcast Apr. 1, 1945), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/holocaust/5107.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2012)
(recordings of the BBC’s radio broadcasts during April 1945 upon the liberation of the
Belsen, Buchenwald, and Zutphen camps).
272
See Atlantic Charter, supra note 59. On the history of the Atlantic Charter,
see, for example, MARTIN GILBERT, 6 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: FINEST HOUR, 1939-1941,
at 1161-64 (1983).
273
Winston Churchill, The Atlantic Charter, Aug. 24, 1941, in VI WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 6472, 6474 (R.R. James ed., 1974).
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proceeds to expressly reference Churchill’s broadcast.
He
continues, “Would mass murder be an adequate name for such a
phenomenon? We think not, since it does not connote the
motivation of the crime, especially when the motivation is based
upon racial, national or religious considerations. . . . Genocide is the
275
crime of destroying national, racial or religious groups.” With
276
this, Lemkin successfully ties his word to Churchill’s great cause.
Yet, it is not apparent from the face of Churchill’s text
that he had in mind Lemkin’s conception of genocide.
Churchill’s entire speech conspicuously omits any mention of
277
Nazi persecution of the Jews. Churchill refers to no motives
other than retaliation, no intent to destroy Russians as a
group. Instead, he stresses the unprecedented volume of blood
shed by Hitler. If Churchill intended the last sentence of the
quoted passage to signify anything more than a nice oratorical
flourish, it may well be something like, “We are in the presence
of a crime of unspeakable magnitude.”
On the other hand, it is well to remember that Churchill
himself was engaged in the rhetorical project of his life—
stiffening British resolve and building alliances with the
Americans and Russians toward the eventual defeat of Hitler.
Churchill too faced rhetorical constraints. It is even possible
that Churchill may have meant to include Nazi persecution of
274

Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227.
Id. at 227-28. In some tellings, Lemkin claims Churchill’s speech as the
direct inspiration for his effort to coin the word genocide. See, e.g., Elder, supra note 34,
at 523 n.7 (“Lemkin said [in 1951] that during WWII he heard a radio broadcast given
by Churchill in which he stated that the Nazis ‘commit[ed] a crime without a name.’
This, according to [Lemkin], led him on the search for the word genocide.”).
276
See, e.g., Editorial, Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1946 (associating
genocide with Churchill’s “crime without a name”); POWER, supra note 9, at ch. 2 (“A
Crime Without a Name”); id. at ch. 3 (“The Crime With a Name”).
Churchill himself may have welcomed Lemkin’s effort to connect their
causes. According to A.M. Rosenthal, Churchill “backed” Lemkin’s nomination for the
Nobel Peace Prize in the 1950s. Rosenthal, supra note 1, at A31. I have not been able to
find any further evidence of Churchill’s support or any explanation for it. The Nobel
archives have no correspondence from Churchill in the Lemkin file. E-mail from Nobel
Institute to author (May 10, 2011) (on file with author). Sir Martin Gilbert has searched
the Churchill archives for materials about Lemkin, but found none. Telephone interview
with Sir Martin Gilbert, honorary fellow, Merton College, Oxford (Mar. 10, 2011). Steve
Jacobs has searched the Lemkin archives (which are incomplete) for correspondence from
Churchill, but found none. Telephone Interview with Steve Jacobs, Associate Professor,
University of Alabama, Department of Religious Studies (Mar. 21, 2011).
277
Churchill had addressed Nazi persecution of Jews in other comments,
public and private, dating back at least as far as 1933. For example, on December 21,
1937, Churchill said, “[I]t is a horrible thing that a race of people should be attempted
to be blotted out of the society in which they have been born.” 5 MARTIN GILBERT,
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: THE PROPHET OF TRUTH, 1922-1939, at 889 (1977); see also id.
at 448, 459, 486, 680-81, 800, 954; GILBERT, supra note 272, at 99, 1004.
275
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the Jews within his “crime without a name,” but was
constrained from expressly saying so. Sir Martin Gilbert
believes the most important constraint on Churchill at that
time was the need to preserve the secrecy of the British spying
program that provided all his intelligence about anti-Jewish
278
atrocities. Churchill also may have been constrained, to some
extent, by the BBC’s reluctance to broadcast atrocity stories,
279
particularly where the victims were Jewish.
Lemkin thus draws on Churchill’s speech as a resource
and characterizes it in a way that is plausible (if contestable). In
so doing, Lemkin positions genocide as a solution to a problem
important enough to be raised by one of the leaders of the Free
World, linking his word with Churchill’s fame and reputation.
b. The Murder of Millions
Lemkin also directly invokes the scale of the Nazi
horrors. “While society sought protection against . . . crimes
directed against individuals, there has been no serious
endeavor hitherto to prevent and punish the murder and
280
destruction of millions.” Also, “when one man is murdered, it
is murder. We cannot accept the proposition that organizing
281
the murder of millions is less than murder.”
278

Telephone Interview with Sir Martin Gilbert, supra note 276; accord
MARTIN GILBERT, CHURCHILL AND THE JEWS: A LIFELONG FRIENDSHIP 186-87 (2007)
(Churchill “had to be careful not to reveal his source, for fear of alerting the Germans
to the fact that their most secret communications . . . were being read by the codebreakers at Bletchley Park.”).
279
See Jeremy Harris, Broadcasting the Massacres: An Analysis of the BBC’s
Contemporary Coverage of the Holocaust, 25 YAD VASHEM STUD. 65 (1996). Harris
offers several explanations for this reluctance, including anti-Semitism among BBC
officials and influential civil servants; concern about stirring “latent antisemitism” in
the British public; anxiety that the British public would regard atrocity stories as
propaganda, a problem exacerbated by revelations that the BBC had in fact broadcast
some propaganda about German atrocities during the First World War; and “the fact
that the British people were simply not interested in hearing more gloomy reports.” Id.;
cf. GILBERT, AUSCHWITZ, supra note 271, at 15 (“[O]n 25 July 1941, a Ministry of
Information Document had warned British policymakers . . . . [that discussion of Nazi
atrocities] ‘must be used very sparingly and must deal always with indisputably
innocent people . . . . And not with Jews.’”).
280
Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227.
281
Raphael Lemkin, The Legal Case Against Hitler, Part I, NATION, Feb. 24,
1945, at 205, 206 [hereinafter Lemkin, Legal Case I]; see also Raphael Lemkin, Letter
to the Editor, Genocide Before the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1946, at C22 (“gassing
millions of human beings”).
Lemkin’s unpublished works press this theme as well. See Lemkin, Totally
Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 367 (“When I studied law, . . . I felt that if the killing
of one man was a crime . . . , the destruction of millions of people should also be a
crime, and, moreover, it should be an international crime . . . .”); id. at 371
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The rhetorical power of this argument is plain. Yet, in
drawing from this rhetorical resource, Lemkin suggests a
conception of genocide as mass-murder at odds with his own
282
“ethnico-cultural concept[ion].”
c. The Advocate’s Foresight
The advocate’s own reputation is often a valuable
resource. If the audience accepts that the advocate has
desirable attributes (e.g., wisdom), that may persuade the
audience to pay greater attention to the advocate’s arguments
or to give those arguments the benefit of the doubt. For
example, if the audience accepts that the advocate has been
correct in the past in important and relevant respects, that
283
provides a resource for the advocate’s current argument. In
cases where the advocate’s reputation is not known to or fully
appreciated by the audience, the advocate may establish it in
the audience’s mind by self-credentialing.
Lemkin deploys this resource in staking claim
284
(justifiably) to being the first to diagnose the horrific nature
of the Nazi regime. In the author’s note to one article, Lemkin
describes himself: “RAPHAEL LEMKIN is Polish but his
(“Sovereignty, I argued, cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent
people. . . . Why is the killing of a million a lesser crime than the killing of a single
individual?” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
282
Cf. COOPER, supra note 31, at 58 (“‘There must be a hierarchy of values in
human society and the preservation of life must be on the top of this hierarchy.’”
(quoting a letter Lemkin wrote on April 19, 1949)).
283
In a similar vein, Aristotle argues that a speaker should “construct a view of
himself as a certain kind of person,” particularly as someone who possesses “practical
wisdom . . . and virtue . . . and good will,” because character (ethos) “is almost . . . the
controlling factor in persuasion.” ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at 38, 120. Aristotle believes,
however, that “this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the
speaker is a certain kind of person.” Id. at 38. Kennedy explains:
Aristotle thus does not include in rhetorical ethos the authority that a
speaker may possess due to his position in government or society, previous
actions, reputation for wisdom, or anything except what is actually contained
in the speech and the character it reveals. Presumably, he would regard all
other factors, sometimes highly important in the success of rhetoric, as
inartistic; but he never says so.
Id. at 38 n.43; see also id. at 311 (describing the Rhetoric’s “fail[ure] to recognize the
great role of the authority of a speaker as already perceived by an audience” as one of
its “limitations”).
284
See Ignatieff, supra note 212, at 26-27 (“To appreciate Lemkin’s
achievement, we must see it not as the ratification of easily available common sense,
but as a counterintuitive leap of the imagination beyond the realm of what common
sense deemed possible. . . . Lemkin [had] the intelligence and the courage to have
identified an abominable new intention when others saw only immemorial
cruelty . . . .”).
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viewpoint is international and his understanding of the nazi
[sic] menace is of more than recent date. . . . At the Madrid
Conference of 1933 he introduced the first proposal ever made
285
to outlaw nazism [sic] by declaring it a crime.” Lemkin also
attributes various harms to the rejection of his Madrid proposal
to outlaw barbarity and vandalism. For example, Axis Rule
states: “If the punishment of genocide practices had formed a
part of international law . . . since 1933, there would be no
necessity now to issue admonitions to neutral countries not to
286
give refuge to war criminals.”
Lemkin likewise claims that the rejection of his Madrid
287
proposal complicated the Nuremberg prosecutions and even,
rather implausibly, that it was “one of the thousand reasons
why . . . [American] boys are fighting and dying in [World War
288
II].”
By attributing such grave consequences to the failure to
heed his previous advice, Lemkin credentials himself as
someone with unique insight into genocide and whose diagnosis
of and prescription for it are therefore due an additional
289
measure of respect. Other Lemkin statements may also be
seen in this light. For example, Lemkin prefaces his
congressional testimony advocating war crimes prosecutions
with the remark, “I base my observations on actual experiences
in this war. I was subject myself to war crimes. . . . I have
290
observed war crimes.” More striking is Lemkin’s description
of a childhood conversation with his mother, after reading the
Polish novel Quo Vadis? about Romans killing Christians, as

285

Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 43; cf. LEMKIN, AXIS RULE,
supra note 3, at 91 (noting that he had proposed, “[a]s far back as 1933,” outlawing
conduct that “would amount to the actual conception of genocide”); Lemkin, War
Against Genocide, supra note 181 (“Dr. Raphael Lemkin has crystallized the concept of
genocide and given it its name.”).
286
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 92.
287
See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 146-47 (“Sir Hartley
Shawcross . . . declared that the failure of this [1933 Madrid] proposal made it
impossible to punish some of the serious Nazi crimes.”).
288
POWER, supra note 9, at 44 & n.43.
289
Lemkin also persuaded other supporters of his genocide project to
credential him in this manner. See, e.g., Editorial, Genocide Under the Law of Nations,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1947, at E11 (“As far back as 1933 Professor Lemkin
submitted . . . a draft of a measure which was to permit the apprehension of a
genocidist . . . .”).
290
Lemkin Statement, supra note 55, at 61.
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“the day I began to crusade” against genocide —a narrative
292
that conveys a sense of destiny.
3. Preexisting International Crimes
Advocates for change often must demonstrate that their
293
Precedent is a powerful resource
proposals are feasible.
against charges of windmill-chasing. If something similar has
been done before, the advocate can establish a greater
likelihood that it may be done again.
From the start, in his Madrid proposal, Lemkin invokes
preexisting international crimes as precedent. He lists seven
recognized international crimes: piracy, counterfeiting of
currency, terrorism, and trade in slaves, women and children,
294
narcotics, and obscene publications. He mentions that this
295
list is not fixed but changes over time. He identifies in the
existing list a theme supporting the prohibition of “general
(transnational) danger” and then explains how barbarity and
296
vandalism fit within that theme.
Lemkin, however, also invokes the precedents in a more
troublesome way. Striving to appeal to the common-sense
notion that the greater threat deserves priority over the lesser,
Lemkin appears to belittle some of the existing offenses. In his
draft of General Assembly Resolution 96(I), he contrasts “the
very serious crime of genocide” with “crimes of a relatively
297
The General Assembly omitted this
lesser importance.”
unfortunate language from the final resolution.
291

KOREY, supra note 37, at 5 (quoting Lemkin).
Cf. Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 381 (recalling that a
colleague at Duke once told him, “I have no doubt that you were saved . . . for a special
purpose . . . . It is bigger than you are, or than any of us—wait and you will see.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
293
Cf. Bitzer, supra note 72, at 33 (“A person who believes his response [to an
exigence] could not in any way modify it is not likely to respond, even though the
exigence is urgent . . . . As modification capability increases, readiness to respond
increases.”). Similarly, Jasinski observes that advocates for change must prove that
“there is a better way to do things”—in other words, beyond establishing the existence
of a problem, they must show that they have a solution that is affordable, effective,
feasible, etc. See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 458.
294
Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 2; accord LEMKIN, AXIS RULE,
supra note 3, at 94 (listing “so-called delicta juris gentium,” including “white slavery
and trade in children, piracy, trade in narcotics and in obscene publications, and
counterfeiting of money”).
295
Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 2-3.
296
Id. at 3-4.
297
U.N. Doc. A/BUR/50, reprinted in 1 THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, supra
note 178, at 3 (“Whereas the punishment of the very serious crime of genocide when
committed in time of peace lies within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the
292
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A.

Rhetorical Success

603

Any assessment of Lemkin’s rhetorical strategy must
begin with its amazing success. Lemkin persuaded the United
Nations to devote its first human rights treaty to eliminating
298
the “odious scourge” he identified, named, and publicized.
The Genocide Convention encapsulates not only Lemkin’s
word, but his sovereignty-bounding purpose. It follows his vision in
many key respects. It accepts his conception of genocide as the
destruction of a group. Only “national, ethnical, racial or religious
299
group[s]” qualify; the Convention omits Resolution 96(I)’s broader
300
The Convention
reference to “political and other groups.”
301
“confirm[s]” that genocide “is a crime under international law,”
subject to prosecution by the courts where it occurs or by such
302
The
“international penal tribunal” as may be established.
Convention’s thrust is prosecutorial; although aimed at both the

judiciary of every State concerned, while crimes of a relatively lesser importance such
as piracy, trade in women, children, drugs, obscene publications are declared as
international crimes and have been made matters of international concern;”); accord
Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, Genocide Before the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1946, at C22 (“It seems inconsistent with our concepts of civilization that selling a drug
to an individual is a matter of worldly concern, while gassing millions of human beings
might be a problem of internal concern. It seems also inconsistent with our philosophy
of life that abduction of one woman for prostitution is an international crime while
sterilization of millions of women remains an internal affair of the state in question.”).
298
Genocide Convention, supra note 14, pmbl.
299
See id. art. II. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 117-71.
300
G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13 (“racial, religious, political and other
groups . . . whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political, or other
grounds”). For a time after passage of Resolution 96 (I), Lemkin adapted his public
comments to the Resolution’s broader conception of genocide. See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL,
supra note 53, at 145-46 (“human groups”); Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7
(“racial, national, religious” and other human groups, plus “linguistic, and political
groups”). Nevertheless, in UN deliberations, Lemkin favored excluding political groups
from the definition of genocide. See Secretariat Comments on Draft Convention, U.N.
Doc. E/447, reprinted in 1 THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, supra note 178, at 209, 230
(describing Lemkin’s opposition on the grounds that “political groups have not the
permanency and the specific characteristics of the other groups” and including them
would be controversial and unnecessary); Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note
7, at 391 (“I myself thought that the destruction of political opponents should be
treated as the crime of political homicide, but not as genocide. Every revolutionary
regime comes to power by destroying some of its opponents.”); SCHABAS, supra note 15,
at 61, 160 (“The exclusion of political groups . . . corresponded to Raphael Lemkin’s
vision of the nature of the crime of genocide.” (citations omitted)).
301
Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. I.
302
Id. art. VI.
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“prevention and punishment” of genocide,
the Convention’s
304
provisions on prevention are notably underdeveloped.
Lemkin achieved his ambition to bound sovereignty
with genocide and make it an international concern—indeed,
an international crime—regardless of traditional notions of
territoriality and nationality. And he achieved it to an extent
that must have seemed quixotic in 1944: twenty states adhered
to the Convention within two years of its adoption, bringing it
305
into force in January 1951; sixty years later, that number has
306
grown to 141 states. Beyond these numbers, moreover, in a
series of groundbreaking decisions, the International Court of
Justice has pronounced that the prohibition of genocide is
307
custom, jus cogens and erga omnes, and that states party to
303

This is reflected in both the formal title of the Genocide Convention, supra note
14, and in Article I, where the parties “undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide.
304
The Convention provides only, “Any Contracting Party may call upon the
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action . . . as they consider
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide . . . .” Genocide
Convention, supra note 14, art. VIII. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 520-92.
Scholars disparaged the weakness of this provision for decades. See, e.g., Van Schaack,
supra note 27, at 1137-39 (criticizing the Convention’s language on prevention as
“frustratingly indeterminate,” “irresolute,” and “anemic”). But see infra note 308 and
accompanying text.
Lemkin plainly cared—deeply and energetically—about preventing
genocide. But his writings display a curious lack of attention to the ways in which his
word, and the resulting Convention, would achieve his goal. This may reflect, given
Lemkin’s own background as a criminal prosecutor, a belief that punishment is
prevention, per ordinary deterrence theories of criminal law. But see U.N. Doc. E/447,
reprinted in 1 THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, supra note 178, at 247-48 (“All criminal
law has a preventive effect. The fact that there is a law tends to deter and prevent
action by persons who might be tempted to commit a crime. Experience shows,
however, that the preventive effect of threats is limited, since these do not stop certain
criminals . . . . In the international field even more than in the national, it is essential
to exercise constant vigilance . . . .”). Alternatively, it may reflect faith that the
newfound United Nations—or, perhaps, individual states—would have the will and
capacity to “prevent[] and suppress[]” genocide effectively if they understood his concept
and the facts of a particular situation. But see KOREY, supra note 37, at 31-32 (suggesting
that Lemkin proposed privately that the UN establish an office devoted to genocide
prevention, but dropped this proposal when others counseled him that it was unrealistic).
305
See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. XIII (bringing the Convention
into force ninety days after the twentieth ratification or accession); UNTS Online,
supra note 64.
306
See UNTS Online, supra note 64; cf. Lauren Walsh, A Conversation with
Oscar Schachter, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 343, 344 (1997) (“In 1948, . . . the
architects planning the future headquarters asked me how many seats they should
make in the General Assembly . . . . An international lawyer would be expected to know
how many sovereign states existed and were potential members. I confidently
answered the architects . . . that they could safely add twenty seats to the fifty-one
[members at that time]. It did not take long for my estimate to be mistaken and for
costly renovations to be needed.”).
307
See Reservations to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) (the Convention’s
“principles . . . are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
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the Convention have an “obligation,” which is “both normative
and compelling,” “to employ all means reasonably available to
308
them . . . to prevent genocide so far as possible.”
Substantively, then, Lemkin produced what Cass
309
Sunstein calls a “norm cascade,” a “rapid shift[] in norms.” He
developed the concept of genocide as a distinct phenomenon, he
named it, he proposed (and later helped to draft) a treaty
outlawing it, and he persuaded the nations of the world to
promulgate and ratify a treaty adopting his word and, to a
considerable extent, his definition and his remedy. Lemkin is a
310
who succeeded through energy,
“norm entrepreneur”
311
persistence, even self-sacrifice.
Lemkin’s rhetorical strategy deserves credit. His
original idea languished until his turn to genocide in 1944.
Genocide proved potent, filling a felt social need for a new word
to address Nazi horrors. Lemkin adroitly affirmed and satisfied
this need, positioning his word as the solution to Churchill’s
312
“crime without a name.”
Luban praises Lemkin’s coinage: “Lemkin’s word
eventually conquered the world. It became one of the most
powerful in any language, and it reshaped the moral landscape
of the world . . . . In doing so, it also reshaped our consciousness
conventional obligation”); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of
Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 64 (July 6) (the “prohibition of genocide” is
“assuredly” jus cogens); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5) (“the outlawing of acts of . . . genocide” is erga omnes).
308
Bosn. & Herz., supra note 269, ¶¶ 427-30.
309
Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms]. Sunstein argues that social norms
influence behavior by tapping “wellsprings of shame and pride,” thus affecting the
“self-conception” and “reputation” of individuals within a community. Id. at 916-17,
952. Sunstein elsewhere notes the power of law qua expression, even without
significant risk of enforcement, to change social norms. See Cass Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031-32 (1996). He writes: “[L]aw
might attempt to express a judgment about the underlying activity in such a way as to
alter social norms. If we see norms as a tax on or a subsidy to choice, the law might
attempt to change a subsidy into a tax, or vice versa.” Id. at 2034. This description of
law’s social power seems particularly apt when applied to the criminalization of
genocide, where the lack of effective enforcement persists as a tragic problem, but
where there nevertheless is a meaningful sense that social norms in the international
community now impose a considerable “tax” on states that commit genocide and even
on states that tolerate its commission by others. Cf. POWER, supra note 9, at 514
(“[T]he word ‘genocide’ . . . has acquired a potent moral stigma. The vows of U.S.
policymakers to never again allow the crime and the lengths to which they have gone,
while allowing genocide, to deny its occurrence is in itself testament to the stigma.”).
310
Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 309, at 909.
311
Cf. Editorial, Raphael Lemkin: Crusader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1959, at 20
(Lemkin’s “crusade . . . . was a heavy burden, and last Friday it killed him . . . . Death
in action was his final argument . . . .”).
312
See supra Part IV.C.2.a.
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and, to some extent, it reshaped our culture as well.” Luban
does not specify how genocide “reshaped our consciousness” or
which “culture” it “reshaped.” I would specify that genocide
reshaped, at the least, the culture of international law and our
consciousness of that law—our consciousness, that is, of the
proper relationships between states; among individuals,
peoples, and states; and among states, law, and justice.
Genocide helped to move our consciousness beyond the narrow
confines of (most) traditional diplomacy toward a wider
dialogue about the concerns of a common humanity with
meaningful participation by nonstates. Genocide helped to start
314
what Philip Jessup first called “a modern law of nations” and
315
then “transnational law.”
In striving to bound sovereignty, Lemkin assaulted the
citadel. Sovereignty was “the fundamental principle . . . on
316
which the whole of international law rests.” In terms of
rhetoric scholarship, sovereignty was (and is) an ideograph of
the international community, a “term[] we use [in public
discourse] to impart value, justify decisions, motivate behavior,
317
and debate policy initiatives.” Common ideographs in U.S.

313

Luban, supra note 26, at 307.
See JESSUP, supra note 134, at 2. Jessup argues that “international law,
like national law, must be directly applicable to the individual,” calling this one of the
two “keystones of a revised international legal order.” Id. Writing before the adoption of
the Genocide Convention, he describes Resolution 96 (I) as “[a] major step” toward
accepting individuals as subjects of international law. Id. at 183; accord Text of
Truman’s Letter Transmitting His Report on U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1947, at 4 (praising
the Resolution as having “profound significance to the state” because of its progress
“toward the application of international law to individuals as well as to states”). Given
Jessup’s emphasis on making international law apply directly to individuals, his decision
to revive the old phrase “the law of nations” was apt. See JANIS, supra note 109, at 13
(showing that “the law of nations” traditionally included individual rights and
obligations, but when Jeremy Bentham coined “international law” he limited his
conception “exclusively [to] the rights and obligations of states inter se”).
315
See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) (arguing that the
traditional term international law fails to capture “all law which regulates actions or
events that transcend national frontiers”). Jessup adds, “Having argued in 1948 that
[recognizing individuals as subjects of international law] was a desirable position . . . , I
am prepared to say it is now established.” Id. at 3 & n.6; cf. Lemkin, Introduction,
supra note 123, at 60 (criticizing the “half-truth” that “states alone” are the subjects of
international law, because “the law of nations is a law of individuals enforced
through . . . governments”).
316
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 263 (June 27); see also Peters, supra note 142.
317
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 309 (citation omitted). Jasinski also compares
ideographs to Weaver’s idea of “ultimate terms,” the “terms to which the very highest
respect is paid.” Id.
314
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public discourse include liberty and national security, as well as
318
sovereignty itself.
The meaning of ideographs is often contested, because
they are inherently abstract and enjoy unique importance in
319
the political vocabulary. “Questions involving the meaning of
political words lie at the very foundation of political society,
and accordingly as they are settled in one way or another, the
320
whole fabric must assume a different shape and character.”
Given the centrality of sovereignty in international society, the
very fabric of that society changes with the content and import
of that word. Lemkin thus challenged “the whole fabric” of the
international legal order by contesting the absolutist vision of
sovereignty as end. He sought to reconstitute that order, with
sovereignty redefined, reimagined as means to human-centered
ends, and subordinated to his new concept of genocide in the
321
hierarchy of values.
Lemkin’s success in reprioritizing international legal
values is shown whenever allegations of genocide arise. No state
asserts a sovereign right to commit genocide. States instead
deny the factual allegations, deny their legal characterization as
322
genocide, or both. In some cases, to be sure, these denials are
318

For one famous example of argumentation in the name of sovereignty, see
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936) (reasoning that the
constitutional doctrine of enumerated powers “is categorically true only in respect of our
internal affairs” because “the United States is not completely sovereign” if the federal
government lacks any power held by other nations with regard to external relations).
319
See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 309-10. If it is “the customary office of a
word to cover, not a point, but a territory, and a territory that is irregular,
heterogeneous, and variable,” NERLICH, supra note 255, at 117 (quoting Whitney),
ideographs cover a larger swath than most words, strategically located and hosting rich
resources. For a more cynical take on the same phenomenon of contestation, see
ORWELL, supra note 267, at 161 (“Many political words are similarly abused. The word
Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable.’
The words democracy, socialism, freedom, patriotic, realistic, justice have each of them
several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with one another.”). But see
MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 131 (2004) (“When communist Bulgaria called
itself a ‘people’s democracy,’ only fools were fooled.”).
320
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 194 (quoting an anonymous writer, 1833).
321
Cf. id. at 522 (“Prudential dilemmas sometimes are resolved by creating
distinctions or by introducing new concepts that help to describe the world in a different
way. An innovative concept such as ‘marital rape,’ for example, restructures how we think
about gender relations and the tension between public obligations and private rights.”).
322
For example, although Serbia & Montenegro contended that it was not
bound by the Genocide Convention, it did not claim a right to commit genocide, but
instead defended on the grounds that “the acts alleged . . . have not been committed at
all” and, “if some have been committed,” they neither were done with the intent
required by the Convention nor were attributable to the state. See Bosn. & Herz., supra
note 269, ¶¶ 65-66 (summarizing the parties’ contentions); see also id. ¶ 80
(summarizing Serbia & Montenegro’s position that it had not succeeded to the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Convention).
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disingenuous—“the tribute that vice pays to virtue.” Even so,
such tributes make and reinforce international law, confirming
genocide’s place in its normative hierarchy.
Indeed, genocide prevention—perhaps best expressed by
the maxim “Never again!”—may even have come to qualify itself
as an ideograph of the international community. This objective
fits comfortably with the human rights purposes of the United
324
Nations, especially when that organization is viewed in the
historical context of its founding in 1945. Institutionally,
embarrassed by its failures in (at the least) Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, the United Nations established the Office of
325
the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, as well as
the ad hoc criminal tribunals. The first Special Advisor has
declared that “preventing genocide is a principle of international
326
law so fundamental that no nation may ignore it.”
Of course, if genocide prevention is an ideograph, it is,
like other ideographs, ambiguous and subject to contestation.
Broadly put, genocide prevention begs the questions captured
in “who has what obligations when?” It invites debate about the
327
328
and prevention,
and about
meaning of both genocide
whether prevention entails a ceiling as well as a floor.
Uncapped, genocide prevention would permit each state to use
force to stop genocide in any other state by acting unilaterally,
without express authorization by the Security Council, and
presumably on its own assessment of the facts and legal
characterization thereof. The palpable conflict between
329
genocide prevention and the outlawing of (most) force must be
323

WALZER, supra note 319, at 4 (describing disingenuous claims about just war).
See supra note 247.
See generally Juan Méndez, The United Nations and the Prevention of
Genocide, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE, supra note 169, at 225 (describing his
work as the first Special Advisor).
326
Id. at 226.
327
Proposals to amend the Convention’s definition have been made since at
least 1952, when the Republic of China proposed changing the official Chineselanguage text to language “roughly interpreted as meaning ‘to cause harm to or to
destroy human groups in a ruthless manner.’” Chinese Will Ask U.N. to Redefine
Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1952, at 8 (noting Lemkin’s opposition). Schabas
identifies at least twelve states that depart from the Conventional definition in their
domestic statutes. See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 130, 161-71. Meanwhile, unofficial
definitions abound. See JONES, supra note 25 (compiling sixteen “scholarly definitions”
proposed 1959-2003).
328
In particular, it has been argued that prevention requires no action beyond
the preventative impact of punishment or beyond a state’s own territory—positions
both rejected by the I.C.J. See Bosn. & Herz., supra note 269.
329
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain . . . from the
threat or use of force . . . .”). The Charter expresses only two exceptions: self-defense
324
325
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settled (like other prudential dilemmas) with a hierarchy fixing
the relative priority to be given to these two high-order values
of international society. This settlement affects not only the
legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention in the modern
military sense of the term but also the “shape and character” of
the international legal order: it determines whether that order
is characterized by independent initiative or collective action,
whether it prefers to risk over- or underenforcement.
B.

Some Qualifications

In assessing Lemkin’s rhetorical success, some
important qualifications are needed.
The Convention sometimes diverges from Lemkin’s
path. Notably, it omits cultural techniques from the list of
330
prohibited acts and focuses mainly on physical harm. This

and actions authorized by the Security Council “to maintain or restore international
peace and security.” Id. art. 51, ch. VII.
330
The Convention’s definition of genocide includes five actus rei: (a) killing;
(b) causing serious injury; (c) “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”; (d) “[i]mposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group”; and (e) “[f]orcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.” See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art.
II. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 172-240. Acts (a)-(c) are physical
techniques in Lemkin’s taxonomy, while (d) is biological. See LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra
note 3, at 86-89; William Schabas, The Law and Genocide, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 187, at 124, 135 (concluding, in light of the Convention’s negotiating
history, that “the words ‘to destroy’ [should be read] as if they are modified by
‘physically’ and ‘biologically’”). On the distinction between biological and physical
techniques, see supra note 185.
The Convention generally omits cultural techniques of genocide. See
generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 207-13, 220, 646. Although central to Lemkin’s
vision, the idea of prohibiting “cultural genocide” lacked support among many
governments. The United States led the opposition, arguing: “‘The decision to make
genocide a new international crime was extremely serious, and the United States
believed that the crime should be limited to barbarous acts committed against
individuals, which, in the eyes of the public, constituted the basic concept of genocide.’”
Id. at 209 (quoting U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.14 (Apr. 21, 1948), at 10); see also Moses,
supra note 187, at 38 (noting that the Netherlands opposed prohibiting cultural
genocide on the ground that it would involve “a lack of logic and of a sense of proportion
to include in the same convention both mass murder in gas chambers and the closing of
libraries”). A Soviet proposal to add cultural techniques to the actus rei was defeated by
a vote of 14-31 with 10 abstentions. See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 213 & n.243.
Act (e) is arguably an exception. Axis Rule does not specifically address it,
but it seems to have both biological (“depopulation”) and social elements. See LEMKIN,
AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 83, 86. UN discourse abbreviated Lemkin’s long list of
techniques to three (physical, biological, and cultural), and Act (e) appears in the
Convention notwithstanding that some deemed it cultural in nature. See, e.g., Draft
Convention on the Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. E/447, in 1 THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION, supra note 178, at 232, 235; cf. SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 201
(discussing whether Act (e) is biological or cultural in nature).
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331

important defeat saddened Lemkin, as it was tantamount to
332
excluding his idea of vandalism from the Convention. The
333
Convention also omits universal jurisdiction. And it does not
require perpetrators to aim at the complete destruction of a
protected group, but only the intent to destroy the group “in
334
whole or in part.” The words “in part” are necessary from a
practical perspective, but they also weaken Lemkin’s cultural
rationale, for a group destroyed in part also survives in part
and may therefore retain the ability to preserve and generate
335
unique cultural contributions.
In addition, genocide’s significance should not be
overstated. Although genocide helped to start the “modern law
of nations” of which it is characteristic, it does not rise to the
sine qua non of that law. Other notables who sought to displace
absolutist sovereignty in the postwar legal order included René

331

Lemkin’s unpublished memoir records his disappointment:

This idea was very dear to me. I defended it successfully through two drafts.
It meant the destruction of the cultural pattern of a group, . . . the shrines of
the soul of a nation. But there was not enough support for this idea in the
Committee. After having overcome so many hurdles and with the end of the
Assembly in sight, I questioned the advisability of engaging in still another
battle. Would it not endanger the passage of the Convention? So with a heavy
heart I decided not to press for it.
Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 393; cf. Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra
note 7, at 71 (anticipating this trade-off by mentioning, in a passage about cultural
genocide, that “the draft convention is drawn up in such a way that its structure
remains valid even if parts should be removed or changed”).
332
See Moses, supra note 187, at 38. Lamenting the decision to drop the
provision on cultural genocide, Lemkin once described it as “the soul of all the
convention.” See COOPER, supra note 31, at 159 (quoting a letter Lemkin wrote on
October 20, 1948, to the future Pope John XXIII).
333
See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. VI (providing for prosecution
founded on the more traditional bases of territoriality and consent). See generally
SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 409-16.
334
See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. II (emphasis added). See
generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 273-86.
335
As Luban writes:
The problem is that once the definition is modified [with “in part”], it loses its
mooring in the group-pluralist theory of value. . . . [G]enocide by destroying
part of a group no longer removes that group from “the family of
man.” . . . [I]t loses the special moral-philosophical quality that requires
singling it out from all other mass killings and mass atrocities. In this way,
Lemkin’s definition of genocide was compromised from birth: to make the
crime prosecutable in a world of territorial states, where genocide might
occur only in one state . . . , the law drifted away from the pure grouppluralist vision that drove him to distinguish genocide as a crime different
from all others.
Luban, supra note 26, at 313 (footnote omitted).
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Cassin, Robert Jackson, and Hersch Lauterpacht. The
Nuremberg trials would have been essentially the same had
genocide never been mentioned there; one can even imagine
that the Rwanda trials would be substantially the same as
well—not in their elements and evidence, but in the persons
charged and the larger moral and political functions served.
339
The Allies, following Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms Speech,
declared “preserv[ing] human rights” as a war aim within
340
weeks after Pearl Harbor and later put the language of
341
human rights in the UN Charter. There is no reason to
believe the Universal Declaration—and the ensuing network of
human rights conventions—would have failed but for the
earlier UN actions against genocide. And traditional notions of
sovereignty have been challenged by an array of pressures
342
often summarized with the shorthand “globalization.”
336

See POWER, supra note 9, at 76. In support of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Cassin used language strikingly like that of Lemkin: “The right of
interference is here; it is here. Why? Because we do not want a repetition of what
happened in 1933, where Germany began to massacre its own nationals, and
everybody . . . bowed, saying ‘Thou art sovereign and master in thine own home.’” Id.;
see also SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 525 (quoting Cassin). The parallel is all the more
striking in light of Lemkin’s later opposition to the human rights covenants. See
POWER, supra note 9, at 74-75.
337
See Jackson, supra note 135, at 354-55 (arguing that sovereignty should be
bound by restrictions on the use of force).
338
See Vrdoljak, supra note 6, at 1168, 1174 (discussing Lauterpacht’s
objections to the “deification” of the state and the “dogma of sovereignty”).
339
Franklin Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms Speech, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=70 (“Freedom
means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who
struggle to gain those rights or keep them.”).
340
See Decl. by the U.N., supra note 59, pmbl. (“Being convinced that
complete victory over their enemies is essential . . . to preserve human rights and
justice in their own lands as well as in other lands . . . .”).
341
See supra note 247. See generally Jan Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The
Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 447 (1992)
(discussing the contributions of international lawyers, NGOs, H.G. Wells, and Franklin
Roosevelt that led to the inclusion of human rights language in the U.N. Charter).
342
For an intriguing new argument that the trend to redefine and constrain
sovereignty has gone too far, see Koskenniemi, supra note 143. Koskenniemi objects
that essentially political matters are treated instead as technocratic, subject to
managerial one-size-fits-all solutions without regard to community preferences that
may vary over time and space. Id. at 67-70. He concludes that “sovereignty articulates
the hope of experiencing the thrill of having one’s life in one’s own hands”—that a
community, and an individual within it, may be “for better or for worse, the master of
one’s life.” Id. at 70. Koskenniemi does not address genocide or crimes against
humanity, but his argument must not allow sovereignty to shield such horrors, because
the victims are (to say the least) excluded from the very community, and denied the
very hope, that Koskenniemi celebrates. Cf. WALZER, supra note 319, at 81 (“[T]he
norm is not to intervene in other people’s countries; the norm is self-determination. But
not for these people, the victims of tyranny, ideological zeal, ethnic hatred, who are not
determining anything for themselves, who urgently need help from outside.”).
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Without genocide, the broad shape of modern international law
would look much the same.
The Genocide Convention is, therefore, better seen as a
start than an end. It enjoys chronological primacy in the
postwar move away from absolutist sovereignty toward
international legal protection of individuals. But it did not
alone suffice to prevent genocide or even to punish it. The
Convention has required numerous procedural elaborations—
including the ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal
Court, the advancement of universal jurisdiction in customary
law, the Responsibility to Protect, and the UN’s early warning
system—just to make a start toward fulfilling the Convention’s
343
promise “to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge.”
Substantively, the international community has had to
supplement genocide with other bounds on absolutist
sovereignty. Modern international law treats genocide as a
pivot between domestic and international, tolerable and
intolerable, legal and illegal—but not as the pivot. All human
344
rights law does the same. Nor does genocide stand alone in
dividing the ordinary and extraordinary. For both international
345
and justification for military humanitarian
prosecution
346
intervention, the line between domestic and international is
347
not drawn at genocide, but at genocide-plus.

343

Genocide Convention, supra note 14, pmbl.
See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 103, at 40 (“[A] key concern . . . [is] making
human rights effective by limiting the atavistic conception of state sovereignty,
subjecting it to an international human rights jurisdiction . . . .”).
345
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (listing the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court).
346
See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶¶ 4.19-4.20 (2001) [hereinafter R2P] (arguing that
“military intervention for human protection purposes is justified . . . in order to halt or
avert . . . large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not”);
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept.
16, 2005) (endorsing R2P); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶¶ 4, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28,
2006) (same); see also African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) art. 8, para. 1, opened for
signature Oct. 23, 2009 (not yet in effect), available at http://au.int/en/treaties (“The
African Union shall have the right to intervene in a Member State . . . in respect of
grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity . . . .”).
347
ICISS proposed to draw the intervention line at both genocide-plus and
genocide-minus, omitting instances of Conventional genocide not threatening “large
scale . . . loss of life.” R2P, supra note 346, ¶ 4.20. When the General Assembly and
Security Council endorsed R2P, however, they did not adopt this limiting language,
demonstrating the pull of genocide on the international community. See supra note 346.
344
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The meaning and use of genocide has always been
criticized and contested. Many advocates simply deploy
genocide as they themselves define it, often as something akin
348
to extermination. Words are invented by individuals, but they
are used by the community. Semantic contestation is normal,
especially for ideographs and other politically important words.
Still, it should be recognized that Lemkin’s rhetorical
strategy might have contributed to public confusion of genocide
with extermination. Lemkin repeatedly associated his word
349
He also linked it to
with Hitler’s “murder of millions.”
Churchill’s “crime without a name” when Churchill had
350
stressed the scale of Nazi murders. A degree of association
between genocide and the Holocaust was inevitable—and
perhaps even necessary for Lemkin’s word to succeed as it did.
Nevertheless, Lemkin’s appeal to public revulsion against the
Holocaust amplified aspects of the Holocaust more akin to
extermination than to Lemkin’s own “ethnico-cultural
concept[ion]” of genocide. Lemkin further obscured his own
conception by incorporating into his writings, for a time, the
General Assembly’s 1946 addition of “political groups” to the
definition of genocide. Even Lemkin’s cultural arguments
sometimes analogize genocide to murder in a way that appears
to equate the two. For example, in the midst of a passage about
culture,
Lemkin
writes,
“The
destruction
of
a
nation . . . . offends our feelings of morality and justice in much
the same way as does the criminal killing of a human being:
the crime in the one case as in the other is murder, though on a
351
vastly greater scale.” In all these respects, then, Lemkin
allowed some tension between his conception of genocide and
the rhetoric he used to promote it.
Lemkin relied on etymology to anchor his word to his
352
conception. Etymology, however, is much less weighty than
Lemkin seems to have thought. Even where etymology
correlates with a word’s first definition, it need not remain
fixed there: “A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary

348
349
350
351
352

See supra notes 24-30, 327.
See supra Part IV.C.2.b.
See supra Part IV.C.2.a.
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 91.
See supra Part IV.C.1.
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greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and
353
the time in which it is used.”
General critiques of etymology aside, Lemkin also
misjudged his own etymology. Genos, despite its credentials in
ancient Greek, is not strongly connected in modern English
with race (or tribe, nation, or ethnicity, let alone religion). No
English words begin with genos- and very few with geno-, none
354
obviously sharing the sense of genos as race. English has
many more gen- words, which derive mostly from genos, but
they display a startling variety of meanings, obscuring their
common root, which in any event is not the racial sense of
355
genos. Simply put, there is no reason to believe that an
educated English reader who saw Lemkin’s word for the first
time could have drawn from knowledge of other gen- or geno356
words to define it correctly.
By contrast, -cide words abound in English and they are
firmly linked with killing. Homicide is more than six hundred
357
Fratricide, matricide, parricide, patricide, and
years old.
regicide date to the sixteenth century, and deicide, infanticide,
358
suicide, and tyrannicide to the seventeenth century. Farmers
and hunters have given us such words as felicide, ovicide,
359
tauricide, and vulpicide —and even such “jocose nonce-words”

353

Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (holding that the
word “income” may have a different meaning in tax law than in the U.S. Constitution).
For more on the lightness of etymology, see supra Part IV.C.1.
354
The OED lists the following words starting with geno-, plus some variants:
Genoa, genosophis, genotype, genouillere, and a few words (several obsolete) relating to
gene (genoblast, genologe, genome, genomere, and genonema). Three of these words have
no discernible nexus to genos: Genoa, genosophis (a sect of ancient Hindu philosophers
of ascetic habits), and genouillere (a flexible piece of armor to cover the knee, from the
French for knee). The other words are traceable to genos, but in the sense of birth,
offspring, or family—not race. See OED, supra note 270.
355
Examples in the OED, supra note 270, include: gender, general, generate,
generic, genesis, genetic, genial, genie, genital, genius, genre, gentle, genuflect, genuine,
and genus. Genie comes from the Arabic djinn and genuflect from the French for “to
bend” and “knee.” The other examples may be traced to genos, but in the sense of birth,
offspring, or family. Even this connection is sometimes obscure: gentle, for example,
originally referred to noble birth, a sense that survives today mainly in gentlemen. Id.
None of these examples offers any hint of genos as race.
356
Cf. Barrett, supra note 12, at 44-45 (quoting Sidney Alderman, a U.S.
negotiator for the Nuremberg Indictment, “The British particularly thought [genocide]
was too fancy a word to put in a legal document, and some of their graduates of Oxford
University said that they couldn’t understand what the word meant.”).
357
See OED, supra note 270, at 332.
358
See I HISTORICAL THESAURUS OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 127, 128
(Christian Kay et al. eds., 2009) (under “(n.) Killing of type of person”) (with updates for
patricide and regicide available online at www.oed.com, last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
359
See id. (under “(n.) Killing of animals”).
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360

as birdicide.
Chemists have invented a variety of
“preparations destructive of animal or vegetable life, [such] as
361
The
algicide, fungicide, germicide, insecticide, pesticide.”
pattern is both clear and (chillingly) familiar: the word X-cide
refers to killing X. In this circumstance, etymology may indeed
help the educated reader understand an unfamiliar -cide word.
If someone were to invent a new product called arachnocide,
many readers would readily deduce its purpose. This points back
to the trouble with genos. A reader unfamiliar with genocide
362
might well think, “It means ‘killing geno,’ but what’s a geno?”
There is also a second difficulty arising from -cide itself.
In every one of the -cide examples given here, the killing is
363
literal. But Lemkin does not limit his idea of genocide to
literal killing, “physical” killing in his typology. Genocide is not
only coinage by analogy to existing words, but also coinage by
metaphor; it is metaphorical death for a people, whether or not
364
it involves physical death for any person. Introducing a novel
metaphorical sense to a suffix with such a settled physical
sense must be difficult under any circumstances, all the more
so (again) given the obscurity of genos in modern English.
VI.

THE VALUE OF RHETORICAL SITUATION ANALYSIS

A.

Lemkin’s Rhetorical Situation and the Genocide
Convention

Bitzer’s rhetorical situation provides a lens to refract
history, a means to see what Lemkin wished to achieve, the
circumstances in which he acted, and the decisions he made.
Bitzer thus lets us consider the cards Lemkin held to better
appreciate how well he played his hand.

360

OED, supra note 270, at 213 (under -cide).
Id.
362
Even a reader familiar with genos and the many English words derived
from its familial senses, supra notes 354-55, might reasonably infer that genocide
means “killing a family” or “killing a relative”—an inference supported, sadly, by the
many -cide words our language needs to describe the murder of relatives.
363
The only counterexamples I have been able to identify in common English
are coincide and decide. The first is technically not a -cide word, because it derives from
the prefix co- (with) and the Latin root incidare, meaning “to occur,” as in incident.
Only decide suggests a metaphorical use of -cide, as it originates in the idea that “to
decide” is “to cut off” deliberations.
364
Cf. LARRY MAY, GENOCIDE: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 84-90 (2010) (discussing
Claudia Card’s argument that individuals who physically survive genocide suffer “social
death,” but arguing that “social loss” or “social injury” are better metaphors).
361
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The Bitzer lens also makes visible Lemkin’s core
priorities. Lemkin’s views are not merely of historical interest;
they have legal import. They contribute to the proper
365
construction of the Genocide Convention. For one salient
example, consider this passage, where the UN Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur applied (and implicitly construed) the intent
366
requirement of Article II :
Some elements emerging from the facts including the scale of
atrocities and the systematic nature of the attacks, killing,
displacement and rape, as well as racially motivated statements
by perpetrators that have targeted members of the African tribes
only, could be indicative of the genocidal intent. However, there
are other more indicative elements that show the lack of
genocidal intent. The fact that in a number of villages attacked
365

The Genocide Convention should, of course, be construed in accordance
with the applicable rules of international law, such as the customary rules codified in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, although the Vienna Convention itself does not apply retroactively
to the Genocide Convention. See id. art. 4. I do not suggest here that Lemkin’s personal
views should be given more weight than is consistent with international law—but,
rather, that his work is relevant under the applicable principles of international law.
For example, General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) provides:
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as
homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such
denial . . . results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and
other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to
moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.
G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13. This language, originally drafted by Lemkin and so
resonant of his views, forms part of the “context” of the Convention as it is referenced
in the Convention’s preamble. It also evidences both the Convention’s “object and
purpose” and the existence of “relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations [among] the parties.” See Vienna Convention, supra, art. 31; see also MARK E.
VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
427-28 (2009) (“[T]eleological interpretation has traditionally played a part in the
interpretation of . . . multilateral, ‘legislative’ conventions. The object and purpose also
plays a particular part in the interpretation of human rights treaties.”).
Even apart from Resolution 96 (I), there may be particular issues where
“[r]ecourse may be had” to Lemkin’s views as a “supplementary means of
interpretation.” See Vienna Convention, supra, art. 32. First, the “preparatory work” of
the Convention (even limiting that concept to formal UN documents) includes some
contributions by Lemkin himself, as well as references to his views by other drafters
and negotiators. Second, and perhaps most controversially, given Lemkin’s unique role
in bringing about the Convention, his views form an important part of “the
circumstances of its conclusion.” Id.; see also VILLIGER, supra, at 445 (“These
[circumstances] include the political, social and cultural factors—the milieu—
surrounding the treaty’s conclusion.”); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES 141 (2d ed. 1984) (Article 32 “emphasi[zes] the need for the
interpreter to bear constantly in mind the historical background against which the
treaty has been negotiated . . . .”).
366
See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. II (“[G]enocide means any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such . . . .”).
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and burned by both militias and Government forces the attackers
refrained from exterminating the whole population that had not
fled, but instead selectively killed groups of young men, is an
important element . . . .
[T]he intent of the attackers was not to destroy an ethnic group
as such . . . . Instead, the intention was to murder all those men
they considered as rebels, as well as forcibly expel the whole
population so as to vacate the villages and prevent rebels from
hiding among, or getting support from, the local population.
Another element that tends to show the Sudanese Government’s
lack of genocidal intent can be seen in the fact that persons
forcibly dislodged from their villages are collected in IDP camps.
In other words, the populations surviving attacks on villages are
not killed outright, so as to eradicate the group; they are rather
forced to abandon their homes and live together in areas selected
by the Government. . . . [T]he living conditions in those camps,
although open to strong criticism on many grounds, do not seem
to be calculated to bring about the extinction of the ethnic group
to which the IDPs belong. . . .
....
[O]ne inhabitant of the Jabir Village . . . . stated that he did not
resist when the attackers took 200 camels from him, although
they beat him up with the butt of their guns. . . . [H]is young
brother, who possessed only one camel, had resisted when the
attackers had tried to take his camel, and had been shot dead.
Clearly, in this instance the special intent to kill a member of a
group to destroy the group as such was lacking, the murder being
only
motivated
by
the
desire
to
appropriate
cattle . . . . Irrespective of the motive, had the attackers’ intent
been to annihilate the group, they would not have spared one of
the brothers.
[O]ne crucial element appears to be missing, at least as far as the
central Government authorities are concerned: genocidal intent.
Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly
displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific
intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on
racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would
seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages
pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes,
primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare. 367

The Commission of Inquiry transformed the
Convention’s intent requirement from “the intent to destroy [a
protected group] as such” into something approaching “the

367

Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, ¶¶ 513-18 (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.
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intent to destroy [i.e., kill] every single member of the group.”
This transformation is evident thrice:
• First, in the argument that “had the attackers’ intent
been to annihilate the group, they would not have spared one of
368
the brothers,” the Commission uses annihilate in the sense of
“reduce to non-existence, blot out of existence”—literally “to
369
nothing.” The arguments that the “attackers refrained from
370
exterminating the whole population” and that survivors “are
371
not killed outright, so as to eradicate the group” reveal the
same search for nothingness.
• Second, in the argument that forced displacement into
camps disproves the presence of genocidal intent as long as
conditions in the camps are minimally adequate to sustain
physical survival there, the Commission introduces a criterion
irrelevant to the destruction of the group as a group (i.e., “as
372
such”). The same is true of the argument that a government
lacks genocidal intent when it aims to quash a rebellion
through counter-insurgency warfare.
• Most of all, the transformation is evident in what the
Commission did not say. Wholly absent is any mention of the
intent to prevent the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa from
surviving as peoples (i.e., “as such”).
The Commission’s approach cannot be squared with the
ordinary meaning of the words “as such.” Schabas (who defends
373
the Commission) concedes elsewhere that his reading of “as
374
Schabas
such” depends on the travaux préparatoires.
contends that this phrase is meant, idiosyncratically, to import
into the Convention a motive requirement specifying that a
group must be destroyed “on the grounds of nationality, race,
375
ethnicity, or religion.” In other words, for Schabas, killing
every single member of a protected group is not enough to
constitute genocide. Rather, all that killing must be done for a
368

Id. ¶ 517 (emphasis added).
OED, supra note 270, at 484. Annihilate derives from the Latin “ad to +
nihil nothing.” Id. at 483-84. Annihilate also has the sense of “[t]o destroy the collective
or organized existence of anything, by reducing it to its elements; to put an army to
utter rout, etc.,” id. at 484, but the Commission is plainly not using this sense, because
the survival of one soldier does not disprove the “utter rout” of an army.
370
Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 367, ¶ 513 (emphasis added).
371
Id. ¶ 518.
372
See id.
373
See William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur:
The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1703, 1705-06,
1714-16 (2006).
374
SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 271.
375
Id. at 306.
369
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particular motive. In Schabas’ view, destroying a group to seize
their land or “for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare”376 is a
377
crime against humanity, but not genocide.
Lemkin’s views inform this debate in several ways.
First, he identifies the destruction of Carthage, for example, as
378
genocide. He accepts Roman actions as enough to support
this conclusion, without pausing to consider whether the
Romans were motivated by ethnic (or national, racial, or
religious) animus—or by the desire for farmland, to prevent a
Fourth Punic War, or other political or military objectives.
Second, let us turn to the Nazi invasion of Poland—the central
experience of Lemkin’s life and the crucible in which he coined
379
Germany invaded, at least in part, to gain
genocide.
380
This goal did not preclude Lemkin from
Lebensraum.
concluding that the Nazis had committed genocide against
381
Slavs —indeed, from pressing for genocide against Poles to be
382
included in the Nuremberg indictment and judgment. This
point is buttressed if we restate the facts in the Commission’s
Darfur report in terms familiar to Lemkin: If Nazi Germany had
invaded Poland, slaughtered thousands of Polish men, raped
thousands of Polish women, burnt hundreds of Polish villages,
beaten and robbed survivors, and forced the survivors into
displacement camps where the living conditions were terrible
but not so terrible as “to be calculated to bring about the
extinction” of the people made to live there, the harm that so
motivated Lemkin—the destruction of a group capable of
making cultural contributions to the world, capable of producing
383
“a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie”—would have come to pass.
The Nazis would have executed “a coordinated plan aimed at
destruction of the essential foundations of the life of [a] national
group[] so that [the] group[] wither[s] and die[s] like plants that
376

Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 367, ¶ 518.
See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 306 (“The crime must . . . be motivated by
hatred of the group. The purpose of criminalizing genocide was to punish crimes of this
nature, not crimes of collective murder prompted by other motives.”).
378
See, e.g., Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227; LEMKIN, AXIS RULE,
supra note 3, at 80 n.3.
379
See generally LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3; cf. Lemkin, AJIL, supra
note 53, at 151 (“Germany’s practices actually provided the basis for developing the
concept of genocide . . . .”).
380
See, e.g., A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR xxiv-xxvi,
105-06 (2005 ed.) (discussing the extent to which Lebensraum moved Germany to war).
381
See, e.g., Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227; Lemkin, War Against
Genocide, supra note 181.
382
See supra note 157.
383
Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 228.
377
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384

have suffered a blight.” The Nazis would have destroyed the
Poles as a people, and they would have done so intentionally.
Lemkin’s writings point to a better construction than
that applied by the Commission and advocated by Schabas: the
intent inquiry should ask whether the perpetrator intended to
destroy a protected group as a group. This approach is truer to
the ordinary meaning of the textual “as such.” It also treats
respectfully the cultural concerns underpinning genocide when
such concerns are made manifest by one of the actus rei listed
in Article II, thus giving meaningful consideration to the idea
385
animating the Convention.
B.

Genocide and New Rhetorical Situations

The Bitzer lens also helps us to focus on genocide’s
continuing value to our public discourse, because Lemkin’s
innovation remade the rhetorical situation for later advocates.
Genocide figures especially prominently in contemporary
discourse about humanitarian intervention. Love it or hate it,
advocates and decision-makers in most public debates about
humanitarian intervention must deal with genocide. It shapes
their options and strategies, creating or helping some moves
while hindering or even precluding others. It influences their
audience, affecting which events are deemed worthy of
attention by the media, policy-makers, and the public. It forces
debate about whether particular events should be
characterized as genocide, whether the Conventional definition
should expand, whether genocide does or should trigger a right
or duty of humanitarian intervention, and whether another
trigger should supplement or replace genocide. On this last
point, genocide’s hold on the language further acts as both
resource and constraint for the neologists who coin words to
advance their new concepts. Democide, ethnocide, gendercide,
384

Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136.
Schabas objects to this approach on the ground that it would capture within
genocide circumstances where “incidental” killings occur during implementation of a
policy limited to acts (such as forced displacement) not listed in Article II. See SCHABAS,
supra note 15, at 271. This objection does not speak to Darfur, however, where the
murders, rapes, and other acts “[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm” cannot fairly be
dismissed as “incidental.” Should an appropriate case arise, it would be open to the
decision-maker to determine whether the “incidental” covered acts (perhaps even acts by
one individual) are too remote from the policy aiming at group destruction by other
means to warrant a finding of genocide in that particular case. In the meantime, I agree
with Schabas that we should not be distracted by hypotheticals unlikely to impact policy
or to be prosecuted by the ICC. See Schabas, supra note 373, at 1711.
385
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humancide, humanicide, omnicide, and politicide all testify to
386
the power of genocide in this field of discourse.
Ultimately, genocide’s role in shaping new rhetorical
situations matters most today. To the extent genocide helps
advocates of worthy actions to prevent and punish atrocities, it
deserves its prominence in our language and our hierarchy of
values. On the other hand, to the extent genocide helps
advocates of unworthy actions or hinders advocates of worthy
actions, it deserves to be redefined, reprioritized, or even retired.
Genocide properly bounds sovereignty, because
governments are instituted among us to secure our rights and
387
safety, so no rule of law worthy of the name should enable
governments to destroy groups of the very people they exist to
388
serve. Sovereignty, like other governmental constructs, must
389
yield to “elementary considerations of humanity.”
These
390
considerations are “intransgressible,” for humanity “is the
391
raison d’etre of any legal system.” But genocide itself also must
be tested against the needs of humanity. The priorities of
international law, and the ideographs of international discourse,
392
This requires
must be those that best serve humanity.

386

See generally R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994) (regarding
democide); C.C. Tennant & M.E. Turpel, A Case Study of Indigenous Peoples: Genocide,
Ethnocide and Self-Determination, 59 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 287 (1990); MARY ANNE
WARREN, GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEX SELECTION (1985); Matthew Lippman,
Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Towards a Declaration on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 183
(1986); PIETER NICHOLAS DROST, 1 THE CRIME OF STATE: HUMANICIDE (1959); LISL J.
MARBURG GOODMAN & LEE ANN HOFF, OMNICIDE: THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA (1990);
Jordan Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and
Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. J. INT’L L. 283 (1986).
387
Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
388
Cf. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 142, at 365-66 (arguing that “the
Kantian fiduciary model [of sovereignty requires] an absolute prohibition” of genocide
and other policies that “constitute a gross infringement of secure and equal freedom”).
389
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (holding that
Albania had a duty under customary law to warn British ships crossing through the
channel, and to notify international shipping generally, of the existence of a minefield
in Albanian territorial waters).
390
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8). Strictly speaking, the Court’s statement addresses only certain
“rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,” but only a slight extension
reaches genocide and other norms “fundamental to the respect of the human person
and ‘elementary considerations of humanity.’” Id.
391
Lillich, supra note 103, at 406; cf. Lemkin, Legal Case I, supra note 281, at
205 (“International law should be an instrument for human progress and justice, not
an obstacle to them.”).
392
I say this without prejudice to those circumstances where other considerations,
such as animal welfare and environmental preservation, warrant our respect independent
of their benefits for humanity, a subject beyond the scope of this Article.
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continuous reexamination of genocide, as with other vital
aspects of our discourse, laws, politics, priorities, and values.
CONCLUSION
“Some words are confined to their history; some are starting points
for history.”–Felix Frankfurter.393

Genocide is a starting point for history. Lemkin coined
394
genocide to “build the law.” He succeeded quickly, with the
Genocide Convention. This accomplishment cannot be
395
396
dismissed as a mere “piece of paper,” a fading rose. It
generated domestic criminal statutes, functioning international
institutions, investigative teams, NGO watchdogs, political
movements—even jail cells. People have been charged with,
tried for, convicted of, and punished for genocide. This is law,
however narrowly one defines it.
Genocide also built customary international law. Beyond
its own recognition as custom, genocide contributed to the
development of some of the foundational principles of modern
international law: peremptory norms (jus cogens) exist and
397
they constrain states; states have responsibilities as well as
rights, responsibilities owed to individuals, even to their own
398
nationals, as well as to other states, perhaps even all other
states (erga omnes); individuals, even high government
officials, may be held accountable for gross offenses in court
399
(domestic, foreign, international, or mixed). Genocide also
helped to modernize other aspects of custom: expanding
universal jurisdiction beyond traditional crimes like piracy, for

393

Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 537 (1947).
394
See Rosenthal, supra note 1.
395
Id.
396
Charles de Gaulle is said to have said that treaties “are like roses and
young girls; they last while they last.” See Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of
Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 304 (1977).
397
See HENKIN, supra note 102, at 39 n.*, 176-77 (crediting the Genocide
Convention with “helping to launch the concept of jus cogens,” a concept that
“derogates pro tanto from state autonomy and the principle of consent”).
398
Id. at 176-77 (“Subordinating state values to human values, [the Genocide
Convention] established that, in principle and in one respect at least, how a state treated
its own inhabitants was a legitimate, appropriate subject of international law.”).
399
Cf. JESSUP, supra note 134, at 2 (describing the “keystones of a revised
international legal order”).
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example, and updating the law of treaty reservations for the
400
age of major multilateral conventions.
Genocide, moreover, built law in James Boyd White’s
deeper sense of law as language and community. It changed
the conversation among states. It provides states a new “range
401
of things to say to each other.” It empowers states with “a set
402
of things they may say”
to object to (certain) atrocities
occurring in another state. The UN instruments enable states
to say that genocide is “a matter of international concern,” “a
crime under international law,” and an “odious scourge”—and
that it is “contrary to the spirit and aims of the United
Nations,” it “has inflicted great losses on humanity,” and it
must be combated with “international cooperation.”403 This
language simultaneously inhibits a state accused of genocide
404
“from saying other things.” It cannot say, “Genocide is good”
or even “Genocide is bad, but outweighed by other priorities.”
And it cannot say, “Mind your own business” or “Pay no
attention to the men suffering behind the curtain.” Genocide
deprives an accused state of the absolute sovereignty defense.
The state is obliged instead to deny the factual allegations or
their legal characterization as genocide. It has to converse
about genocide, engaging in a discourse structured by the
Genocide Convention. Genocide thus facilitates interstate
conversations on subjects that previously had been difficult to
raise and easy to dismiss. By changing the conversation in this
way, genocide reconstituted the community of nations: it moved
the community from one devoted (almost) exclusively to
interstate relations to one concerned as well with (certain of) a
nation’s own internal acts. The new community became
transnational, rather than international, in nature.
For all its historic significance, it must be acknowledged
that genocide stands accused of making history in another sense
as well. The charge is that genocide enables mass atrocities
(including genocide itself) by interfering with effective efforts to

400

See Vienna Convention, supra note 365, arts. 19-23 (following the ICJ’s
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention).
401
WHITE, supra note 2, at xi.
402
Id. at 95-96 (“The law is literally and deliberately constitutive: it creates
roles and relations, places and occasions on which one may speak; it gives to the
parties a set of things that they may say, and prohibits them from saying other things;
it makes a real social world.”).
403
See G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13; Genocide Convention, supra note 14,
pmbl., art. I.
404
WHITE, supra note 2, at 95-96.
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stop them. To the extent this is true, genocide must yield to
new definitions, new priorities, or new terms. It might be
changed, supplemented, or replaced altogether—that is, it might
be “confined to [its] history.” The Bitzer prism applied here can
contribute to that assessment of genocide’s future by making
visible genocide’s impact on the rhetorical situation of advocates
for worthy actions against atrocity.

405

See supra Part V.B.

